In this paper we present a first attempt to develop a representative and flexible static tax-benefit microsimulation model, based on an exact match among a representative sample survey of the Italian income and living conditions in 2009-2010, provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics, and corresponding personal income tax returns, as well as cadastral data of the real estate properties of each individual, provided by the Department of Finance of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance on the same tax year. This static taxbenefit model can evaluate tax revenue and the redistributive impact of property and personal income taxation based on income types and levels actually declared with details of tax deductions. It should allow more reliable and detailed results compared to those based only on survey data and incomes declared to interviewers. JEL: C81, H23, H24

The personal income tax-benefit system influences, through marginal and average tax rates, income redistribution, labour supply, and tax evasion. In this paper we present, for the main taxpayer types and income levels the statutory and implicit marginal tax rates generated by the Italian personal income tax-benefit system components (social contributions, personal income tax, income type deductions, family-related deductions, family allowance, local surtaxes, and the "80 euro monthly bonus") along with the effective marginal tax rates deriving from their interaction. These tax rates are computed both for hypothetical taxpayer types (employee, retiree, self-employed with and without dependent family members) and using a microsimulation model based on a representative sample.The results show that the Italian tax-benefit system generates a broad range of effective marginal tax rates, with positive and negative values, determining, in some cases, also "poverty traps" (that is a marginal tax rates higher than 100 percent). The marginal and average tax rates are also sometimes decreasing with growing taxable income, while at a low level of income we have such high tax rates that a disincentive for labour supply may result. With this evidence, a correction of the Italian tax-benefit system appears desirable both to preserve a more efficient income redistribution as well as labour supply incentives.