Ross's Kritik der sogenannten praktischen Erkenntnis pertains more to moral philosophy than to the philosophy of law, even if its contents are important for the latter, too. Its main objective is to show the theoretical groundlessness of any evaluative judgment. This happens when Ross takes the behaviourist approach of reducing psychology to physiology, which opens up fruitful comparisons with Marxist materialism, and in particular with that of Georges Politzer. Another fundamental question concerns the assumption that theoretical nihilism would lead to practical nihilism, as argued by Theodor Geiger (but denied by Ross). And yet, if Geiger is right, can this have no effect on people's everyday lives?

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This paper examines Max Adler’s philosophical thought, in order to elucidate how he was able to spot a religious meaning in the materialistic conception of history and to understand his connection to Judaism. The first part expounds on how the prominence of religious issues was perceived in the Marxist milieu; the second part analyzes Adler’s particular position, above all in harmony with Kantian philosophy; and the third part brings out the essential differences between Adler’s and Kant’s ideas on religion. Finally the paper shows how Adler’s hope in an ultramundane salvation of mankind separates his interpretation from Jewish messianism.

El período tal vez más fecundo en la producción científica de Ronald Dworkin es el que abarca sus dos primeras obras importantes, Los derechos en serio y El imperio de la justicia. En ellas el jurista norteamericano se mueve hacia varios objetivos, a veces incluso contradictorios, y elabora una de sus teorías más ca­racterísticas, la de la única respuesta correcta. El ensayo intenta esbozar una lectura unitaria de estos escritos, basándose en los rasgos fundamentales del realismo jurídico y de algunas versiones del positivismo, aunque eso implique pasar por alto muchas de sus partes. Por último, se confronta esta interpreta­ción con el asunto de la tolerabilidad, como mucho teorética, del Derecho injus­to, que ella parece admitir