Many conceptual frameworks for hope have been proposed, but empirical evidence on its predictive power in mental health is lacking.

The essential feature of schizophrenic existence is its being disembodied. This is the feature that unifies the varied dimensions of that existence. The disembodiment of the self, of the self-object relation and of interpersonal relationships all lead to a kind of world in which the schizophrenic person lives and behaves like a soulless body or a disembodied spirit.

Background: In this paper we tested the hypothesis that persons with eating disorders (EDs) are affected by disturbances of the way they experience their own body (embodiment) and shape their personal identity, assuming that the various kinds of anomalies of eating behavior are consequences thereof. Sampling and Methods: We developed and validated a new self-reported questionnaire named IDEA (IDentity and EAting disorders), which was administered to 147 ED patients and 187 healthy controls. Test-retest reliability, internal consistency, psychopathological correlates, and concurrent validity were evaluated. A factor analysis was performed to verify the distribution of items into subscales. Results: The questionnaire showed good test-retest reliability, and internal consistency. IDEA scores were specifically associated with ED psychopathology, and they did not show any correlation with sociodemographic and general clinical variables. Four factors were extracted, which were related to the following phenomena: ‘feeling oneself only through the gaze of the other and defining oneself only through the evaluation of the other’, ‘feeling oneself only through objective measures’, ‘feeling extraneous from one’s own body’, and ‘feeling oneself through starvation’. Conclusions: IDEA represents a multidimensional, brief, versatile, easy-to-perform instrument for clinical evaluation, assessing abnormalities in lived corporeality, and of personal identity, which appeared to be specifically associated with the core features of ED psychopathology. The main limitations of the study are the cross-sectional design. Also, it is impossible to ascertain whether the domains we assessed are specific traits of patients with EDs, or state-related features. To answer this question, a longitudinal study is needed.

Abnormal time experience (ATE) in schizophrenia is a long-standing theme of phenomenological psychopathology. This is because temporality constitutes the bedrock of any experience and its integrity is fundamental for the sense of coherence and continuity of selfhood and personal identity. To characterize ATE in schizophrenia patients as compared to major depressives we interviewed, in a clinical setting over a period of 15 years, 550 consecutive patients affected by schizophrenic and affective disorders. Clinical files were analyzed by means of Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR), an inductive method suited to research that requires rich descriptions of inner experiences. Of the whole sample, 109 persons affected by schizophrenic (n = 95 acute, n = 14 chronic) and 37 by major depression reported at least 1 ATE. ATE are more represented in acute (N = 109 out of 198; 55%) than in chronic schizophrenic patients (N = 14 out of 103; 13%). The main feature of ATE in people with schizophrenia is the fragmentation of time experience (71 out of 109 patients), an impairment of the automatic and prereflexive synthesis of primal impression-retention-protention. This includes 4 subcategories: disruption of time flowing, déjà vu/vecu, premonitions about oneself and the external world. We contrasted ATE in schizophrenia and in major depression, finding relevant differences: in major depressives there is no disarticulation of time experience, rather timelessness because time lacks duration, not articulation. These core features of the schizophrenic pheno-phenotype may be related to self-disorders and to the manifold of characteristic schizophrenic symptoms, including so called bizarre delusions and verbal-acoustic hallucinations.