In this paper we consider whether a pragmatics of semantic content can be a useful approach to legal interpretation. More broadly speaking, since a pragmatic conception of meaning is a component of inferential semantics, we consider whether an inferentialist approach to legal interpretation can be useful in dealing with some problems of this important aspect of law. In other words, we ask whether Legal Inferentialism is a suitable conception for legal interpretation. In Section 1 we briefly consider the semantics/pragmatics debate in contemporary philosophy of language and in relation to legal interpretation. In Section 2 we discuss the relations between a pragmatics of semantic content and an inferentialist conception of content. In Section 3 we consider how Inferentialism can be applied to legal interpretation. Finally, in Section 4 we consider some possible advantages and drawbacks of Inferentialism applied to legal interpretation and adjudication.1 Remember, however, that the distinction has distinguished ancestors. Consider the Medieval classification (Trivium) according to which Grammar teaches us how to speak correctly, Logic how to speak truly and Rhetoric how to speak elegantly (cf. Moody 1953).

First, the article addresses the claims that Allen and Pardo make on the abductive nature of fact-finding in the framework of relative plausibility, and it considers also whether abduction and inference to the best explanation (IBE) can be taken as the same. Second, the article addresses the critique that IBE/relative plausibility is too weak to comply with the criminal standard of proof. On these issues the article argues that it is inappropriate to equate abduction and IBE (the former is just a component of the latter), which also means that the relative plausibility account is better construed as an IBE claim rather than as abduction; and it argues that the relative plausibility account survives the critique based on the criminal standard of proof, because, simply put, fact-finders need to consider whether the best explanation of the evidence meets the relevant standard of proof.

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The A Simili Argument draws the conclusion that a target case has a normative property Q since it shares a relevant property P with a source case. It can be seen as a complex inference constituted by three inferential steps: An abduction of the relevant property P, an induction of the class having that property, and a deduction of the target's having property Q. A major problem of this argument is the characterization of the property relevance. The standard answer refers to the notion of ratio: It is the ratio that fixes what is relevant for what. But the determination of the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. This issue is considered here from an inferentialist point of view, claiming that the ratio and relevance are determined by the normative statuses reciprocally attributed by the speakers in the context of legal argumentation.The A Simili Argument (ASA), or argument from analogy, draws the conclusion that a target case has a certain property since it is relevantly similar to a source case. A major issue of the argument is the notion of relevance. When is a target case relevantly similar to a source case? What criteria can we provide for such relevance? Is legal relevance different from relevance in other domains?In legal matters, the standard answer refers to the notion of ratio legis or, in judicial contexts, ratio decidendi: It is the ratio which establishes what is relevant for what. But, as legal scholars know well, the determination of the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task.Here we will look at such an argument from an inferentialist point of view. We will make reference to the idea of scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom and will claim, firstly, that ratio and relevance are determined by the normative statuses reciprocally attributed by * A draft of this paper was presented at a workshop of the 23rd IVR World Congress, August 2007, Krakow. The authors wish to thank E. Feteris and H. Kloosterhuis for their invitation to take part in that workshop, and all the participants for their helpful suggestions.