Public works often suffer from long durations and time escalations, which entail the dissatisfaction of collective needs. Using micro-level data on the works recently procured by the municipalities of a large Italian region, we analyse delay incurrence and the subsequent time-to-completion of works. For this purpose, we rely on a split-population duration model. Our findings show that appropriate levels of expertise and experience – which are often believed to be lacking in municipalities – have a role in speeding up works' executions. The lack of experience is actually an issue that requires appropriate policy remedies, in that it brings to higher delay probability and longer delay durations. The same applies to municipalities that resort to late payments in response to budget constraints.

Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the intensity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where the two …rms enter in a new market. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, delivering a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing, to show that softening competition may indeed more than o¤set the standard e¤ect generated by trade costs, thereby leading to a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and FDIs.

Empirical evidence shows that an increase in trade liberalisation causes an increase in foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle by exploiting the intensity of competition in a Bertrand duopoly with convex costs where the two …rms enter in a new market. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, delivering a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing, to show that softening competition may indeed more than o¤set the standard e¤ect generated by trade costs, thereby leading to a positive relationship between trade liberalisation and FDIs.JEL Numbers: F12, F13, F23

This paper investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries' relative sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality a↵ect potential welfare gains of trade liberalisation. In line with Lambertini (1997a) we show that, as long as no trade policy is undertaken by the government of the larger country, trade liberalisation is not feasible since the latter always loses from opening to trade. A subsidy policy in favour of the firm producing the clean good is, on the contrary, shown to give both countries the right incentives to liberalize trade. Allowing for redistributive transfers between countries further extends the parametric range for which trade liberalisation is feasible under the subsidy scheme. The alternative situation, in which the green firm is based in the larger country, is also briefly sketched to find that free trade does give rise to a global welfare increment with no need of accompanying trade policies.JEL Numbers: F12, L13, H23

This paper describes the Remi-Irpet macroeconometric multisectoral model. The Remi-Irpet, based on an input-output core structure, has its most distinctive feature in the modelling of vertical pecuniary externalities à la Fujita-Krugman-Venables which represents the core dynamization mechanism. Our contribution first presents the theoretical background of the model. Second, we present a simulation exercise performed through the model in which we evaluate the structural impact of incoming FDIs for Tuscany. The impact analysis is defined in terms of (i) change in the overall productive capacity and (ii) medium-term changes in prices and productivity, driven by the changes in the accessibility to labour and intermediate inputs.JEL classification: R10, R11, R15