China's Belt and RoadInitiative (BRI) is, above all, a connectivity project. As connectivity requires financial support, in the past few years China has undertaken several institution-building activities at the national and international level, mainly in the financial and economic sector, showing a new propensity to influence global economic governance. In particular, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has drawn attention worldwide. How does this institutionbuilding process connect with BRI? Are these institutions just a vehicle for exporting China's capital and overcapacity, or do they signal a potential wider challenge to the post-World War II liberal international order? By analyzing the first loans approved by the bank, the present paper argues that far from representing a China-led challenge to the Western-led liberal order, the AIIB, while promoting Chinese commercial and geopolitical interests, shows the resilience of the global financial regime created by the West.

In a rapidly changing world, middle powers with no obvious role to play on the global stage have the difficult task to read the international environment in order to formulate and implement a coherent and possibly effective foreign policy. In order to do so, decision makers either reproduce old ideas or develop new ones. Considering the ideas put forward in their inaugural speeches by Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers in office after 2001, we suggest that Italy’s institutional actors appear to be aware of the changes occurred in the international system after 1989, and in particular after 9/11. The national role conceptions sustaining Italy’s present foreign policy goals reflect such awareness, being quite different with respect to the picture offered by Holsti in his seminal work published in 1970. Ideas expressing foreign policy goals are also reasonably well grounded in ideas on how the world works or linked to operational ideas, yet the country’s foreign policy appears feebly focused, even though focus is explicitly very much sought for. Some explanations for such a lack of focus which makes Italy’s foreign policy design rather ineffective are offered.

In 2015, seventeen European states joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as Founding Members. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, among the group, have the largest share of capital and votes, giving them significant voice in the Bank. The purpose of the European members in joining was mainly twofold: (i) to help increase financial flows available for investment infrastructure in Asia; and (ii) to help ensure that the new Bank would adhere to global financial, environmental and social standards, as established by the existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). It can be said that the Europeans have largely succeeded. Existing MDBs have served as models for the standards which the AIIB is institutionalizing. However, some European-based civil society organizations are increasingly critical of the operations of the AIIB. Moreover, some developing countries may see the AIIB's standards as an unnecessary burden. It can therefore not be assumed that the AIIB will continue to expand its portfolio by merely complementing the existing MDBs.In July 2019, the 4 th Annual Meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was convened -for the very first time outside Asia -in Luxembourg. The international financial hub was also the first European country to announce its intention to join the AIIB ('the Bank' in this article) on March 11 th 2015, one day before the United Kingdom 1 . During the opening session in Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, the Prime Minister of the host country, recalled his decision to join or not to join the AIIB as 'not an easy one' 2 . In the end, Luxembourg joined because, in addition to believing in Asia and multilateralism, the Prime Minister also still believes that 'economy and ecology are not enemies'. Then, in an address to more than 3,000 delegates, observers and participants to the meeting, the Grand Duke of Luxembourg described the AIIB as an institution in line with the multilateral approach that the world has come to know since Bretton Woods and that has been serving post-WWII Europe so well. He emphasized that only international co-operation leads to economic, social and political development, and that the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations Assembly 2015) are 'a common duty and responsibility' for all. Finally, AIIB president Jin Liqun remarked that the Bank embodies European values, has zero tolerance for corruption, and supports the green economy -hence its motto 'lean, clean and green', and reflecting operational efficiency, transparent working methods, and commitment to sustainable development. Jin importantly acknowledged the Europeans' contribution in bringing to the Bank the same governance structures to be found in the existing Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), in which European states are members and participants (i.e. all of the major MDBs) 3 . This essay asks what is Europe's role in the AIIB, what interests and agendas are European member-states pursuing, what vision of future priorities are the Europea...

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Starting from the imperfect nature of Myanmar's democracy, this paper aims to answer two questions. First, can Myanmar's transition be defined as a case of democratization, or is it, rather, a case of authoritarian resilience? To state this differently: is the progress enjoyed by Myanmar's polity the outcome of an ongoing process that is supposed to lead to a fully fledged democracy, or, rather, an attempt to enshrine elements of authoritarian governance under a democratic guise? Second, if the balance leans towards the latter instead of the former, how did authoritarian resilience work in Myanmar? The transition is analysed from a long-term perspective, moving from the 1988 pro-democracy uprising up to the most recent events. Data were collected from available published sources and from three fieldworks conducted by the authors in Myanmar. The paper concludes that Myanmar's transition is better understood as a case of authoritarian resilience than as democratization and highlights three core traits of Myanmar's authoritarian resilience: first, the very top-down nature of the political transformation; second, the incumbents’ ability to set the pace of political reform through the use of repression and political engineering; and third, the divide-and-rule strategy used as a means to keep contestations separated and local.