The complex transition from convict to free labour influenced state intervention in the employment relationship, and initiated the first minimum labour standards in Australia in 1828. Since then, two principal sets of tensions have affected the enforcement of such standards: tensions between government and employers, and tensions between the major political parties over industrial and economic issues. This article argues that these tensions have resulted in a sustained legacy affecting minimum labour standards' enforcement in Australia. The article outlines broad historical developments and contexts of minimum labour standards' enforcement in Australia since 1828, with more contemporary exploration focusing specifically on enforcement practices and policies in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction. Current enforcement practices are an outcome of this volatile history, and past influences remain strong.

This paper outlines the methods and outcomes of a study into equity management strategies in Australian private sector organisations reporting to the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency (EOWA). Reports from 1,976 organisations indicate 11 key factors characterising equity management in Australia. The study highlights differences within previously identified social structural policies, temperamental and opportunity policies and identifies a further policy type, categorised as “support policies”. Differences have also been identified in relation to distribution structures, suggesting that gender is not the sole consideration in determining equity management strategies. The justice principle of distribution also figures strongly in equity management implementation.

Employer non-compliance with workers' entitlements has been largely ignored in Australian industrial relations. The legal and regulatory literature however, identifies arguments relating to employer propensity to evade regulatory requirements, as well as highlighting environmental factors that may influence such behaviour. This article explores these issues in the Australian federal industrial relations jurisdiction, as well as providing a picture of employer evasion of minimum labour standards between 1986 and 1995: who is exploited and in respect of what entitlements. Industry contexts and common characteristics of non-compliance are outlined by exploration of 30 awards ranked by the extent of underpayments recovered by the federal inspectorate during the period. Employer evasion of workers' entitlements is arguably a calculated business decision, prompted or facilitated by intense competition, precarious employment (particularly female and youth), non-unionized workplaces and under-resourced enforcement agencies.

Despite awards and industrial agreements providing legally binding conditions of employment, many Australian employees do not always secure their employment entitlements. The inspection and prosecution strategies adopted by or forced upon the agency tasked with monitoring and enforcing the regulations are a key factor affecting whether or not employees will recover monies owed from non-compliant employers. This article examines the outcomes of different inspection and prosecution regimes between 1952 and 1995 in the Australian federal industrial relations system, and makes three points. The first is that employer evasion of employee entitlements has been significant, and sustained. Second, the shift from routine inspections to a complaints-based inspection strategy has reduced the probability of detection and subsequently encourages employer evasion. Third, the use of prosecution as a tool of `last resort' has provided little deterrence to employer non-compliance. The extent of evasion in a centralized industrial relations system raises questions about evasion in decentralized systems.

Government contracts for services typically include terms requiring contractors to comply with minimum labour standards laws. Procurement contract clauses specify reporting procedures and sanctions for non-compliance, implying that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce minimum labour standards within contract performance management. In this article, the case of school cleaners employed under New South Wales government contracts between 2010 and 2011 is the vehicle for exploring the effectiveness of these protective clauses. We find that the inclusion of these protective clauses in procurement contracts is unnecessary in the Australian context, and any expectations that government contracting agencies will monitor and enforce labour standards are misleading. At best, the clauses are rhetoric, and at worst, they are a distraction for parties with enforcement powers.