In a recent essay, Richard Snyder has stated that: “[A] paradox in political science is the lack … of any systematic attention to the analysis of the decision-making behavior of judges.” It is not my purpose to argue either for or against the particular frame of reference for decision-making analysis advocated by Snyder. I do believe, however, that he has correctly identified the approach—the analysis of judicial decision-making as an aspect of political behavior—which is most likely to command the focus of interest and activity of the coming generation of political scientists whose substantive concern is with the study of political problems in the area of our discipline traditionally known as public law.The concept “political behavior” remains sufficiently novel within the public law fraternity to impose something of an obligation to make clear what I have in mind in using the term. I shall borrow from David B. Truman who, in a Brookings Lecture not long ago, defined the “behavioral sciences” as “those bodies of knowledge, in whatever academic department they may be found, that provide or aspire to provide ‘verified principles’ of human behavior through the use of methods of inquiry similar to those of the natural sciences.”

Textbooks in public administration customarily conclude with a section on administrative responsibility. The charitable inference is that this location betokens the saving of the best till last, rather than the appendage of an afterthought. Herbert Kaufman might explain it as the preoccupation of the past generation of political scientists with the legitimation of the efficient exercise of administrative power to subserve the goals of the social state, with a consequent sublimation of the emerging problem of the control of large, professionalized bureaucracies. However that may be, it does seem clear that, with the exception of administrative decisions which adversely affect “civil liberties,” most political scientists have been content to let lawyers and defenders of the free enterprise system worry about the restraint of administrative action.

Abstract. Supreme Court oral argument (OA) is one of many face-to-face settings of political interaction. This article describes a methodology for the systematic observation and measurement of behavior in OA developed in a study of over 300 randomly selected cases from the 1969-1981 terms of the u.S. Supreme Court. Five sources of observation are integrated into the OA database at the speaking turn level of analysis: the actual text of verbal behavior; categorical behavior codes; aspects of language use and speech behavior events; electro-acoustical measurement of voice quality; and content analysis of subject matter. Preliminary data are presented to illustrate the methodology and its application to theoretical concerns of the research project. Peterson, who has published on a wide variety of topics in biopolitics and political behavior, is Professor of Political Science at Alfred University. Glendon Schubert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, is a long-time and prolific student of judicial politics, constitutional law, and biopolitics.Stephen Wasby is Professor of Political Science at the State University of New York at Albany. His career has been devoted to the study of public law and judicial politics.A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT of political behavior occurs through face-to-face interaction. The face-to-face setting is present when small groups meet, when candidates face off in debates, and when lawyers negotiate in the corridors of courthouses (Dorff and Steiner, 1981;Nardulli, Flemming and Eisenstein, 1984). The face-to-face setting cuts across levels of government from municipal councils to international summit meetings. It also cuts across time; the face-to-face setting was no doubt even more common in politics 50,000 years ago than it is today. Although a substantial proportion of face-to-face interactions is not accessible to political researchers, another substantial proportion is. Indeed, there is a rapidly expanding wealth of raw political data stored on videotape, awaiting the attention and curiosity of political scientists.' Advances in video recording and microcomputing technology have made the concept of systematic observation of face-to-face politics more physically practical and financially feasible for political researchers (J. N. Schubert, 1988). In contrast with other scientific disciplines in and out of the social sciences, political science has no tradition of direct, observational field research. A few political scientists, however, have begun to apply the theoretical and methodological approach of human ethology in observational studies of politics (Watts,

Much recent research in the decision-making of the United States Supreme Court has been characterized by a pronounced emphasis upon the invocation of socio-psychological theory and statistical methods of data processing in lieu of exclusive reliance upon the legal-historical theory and methods typical of most research in this field of study. Symbolic of this development is the increasing tendency of political scientists to consider constitutional law as an aspect of political behavior as well as a branch of law, and correspondingly, to study the subject matter as judicial behavior. Naturally, this recent work has evinced a preoccupation with unidimensional analysis, since it is less complicated to work with one variable than with many, and the experience so gained no doubt is a prerequisite to multivariate study. Nevertheless, students who remain committed to the more traditional workways in constitutional law are quite right in insisting, as they do, that most Supreme Court cases raise what at least appear prima facie to be many issues for decision, and that their more subjective and impressionistic mode of analysis retains the great virtue of not oversimplifying the rich complexity of many Supreme Court cases to the extent that inescapably seems to be required by the newer theories and methods. Clearly, further advances in the behavioral study of Supreme Court decision-making depend upon the development of multidimensional models of Court action, which will make possible the observation and measurement of interrelationships among the significant major variables that in combination provide the basis for an adequate explanation of the manifest differences in the voting and opinion behavior of the justices.

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