A is paper considers the interest rate policy of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) in the post-nancial liberalization and deregulation era. We nd that ( ) the Bank's interest rate smoothing tendency is the main determinant of its monetary policy in this period, ( ) the CBRT does not seem to be responsive to the developments in real economy (output), and ( ) although in ation targeting central banks are not supposed to pay attention to exchange rates, the CBRT appears to be slightly responsive to changes in real exchange rate. In answer to the question of whether there is a deeper underlying structural constraint binding the CBRT's "independence," it seems clear that the global nancial system is restricting the ability of the central banks to pursue "independent" policy objectives. R L'article aborde la politique des taux d'intérêt de la Banque centrale de la République de la Turquie (BCRT) durant la période qui a suivi la libéralisation et la déré-glementation des marchés nanciers. Les auteurs constatent que : ( ) durant cette période, le facteur déterminant de la politique monétaire de la BCRT a été sa tendance à modi er à petite dose les taux d'intérêt; ( ) la BCRT ne semble pas avoir réagi aux faits nouveaux dans l'économie réelle (production); et ( ) même si les banques centrales ayant une cible d'in ation ne sont pas censées prêter attention au taux de change, la BCRT semble avoir réagi un peu aux variations du taux de change réel. Quant à savoir si une structure sous-jacente plus profonde exercerait une contrainte qui limite « l'indépendance » de la BCRT, la réponse est claire : le système nancier mondial restreint la capacité des banques centrales de poursuivre des objectifs « indépendants » en matière de politiques.

For the post-Kyoto period, Turkey strongly emphasizes the establishment of national emission trading system by 2015 and its integration with the EU ETS along its accession process to the EU. In this paper, we study the mechanisms of adjustment and economic welfare consequences of various ETS regimes that Turkey considers to apply by 2020, i.e. regional ETS and international trading within the EU ETS. We conduct our analysis under the current EU 20-20-20 emission target, 20%, and also under its revised version, 30%. We find that Turkey has economic gains from linking with the EU ETS under the 20% cap, in comparison to the domestic ETSs. Despite the EU's welfare loss under linkage in comparison to the case where Turkey has domestic abatement efforts, it still prefers linking as it increases economic well being compared to the case where Turkey does not abate. Under 30% cutback, Turkey has critical output loss under linkage due to high abatement burden on the EU, while the EU is better off as it passes some of its abatement burden to Turkey. Therefore, emission quotas and their allocation across the ETS and non ETS sectors become highly critical in distributing the overall economic gains from bilateral trading. © 2013 Elsevier Ltd