Feeling of knowing (FOK) is a metacognitive process which allows individuals to predict the likelihood that they will be able to remember, in the future, information which they currently cannot recall. Although FOK provides evidence for the mechanisms of metacognitive systems, the neurobiological basis of FOK is still unclear. We investigated the neural correlates of FOK induced by an episodic memory task in 77 younger adult participants. Data were gathered using eventrelated potentials (ERPs). ERP components during high, low, extremely high and extremely low FOK judgments were analyzed. Stimulus-locked ERP analyses indicated that FOK judgment was associated with greater positivity for P200 component at frontal, central, and parietal electrode zones and greater negativity for the N200 component at parietal electrode zones. Furthermore, results revealed that amplitude of the ERP components for FOK judgments were affected by the level of FOK judgment. Results suggest that ERP components of FOK judgment observed within a 200 ms time window support the perceptual fluency-based model.

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The characterization of the relationship between predictions and one-shot episodic encoding poses an important challenge for memory research. On the one hand, events that are compatible with our previous knowledge are thought to be remembered better than incompatible ones. On the other hand, unexpected situations, by virtue of their novelty, are known to cause enhanced learning. Several theoretical accounts try to solve this apparent paradox by conceptualizing prediction error (PE) as a continuum ranging from low PE (for expectation-matching events) to high PE (for expectation-mismatching ones). Under such a framework, the relationship between PE and memory encoding would be described by a U-shape function with higher memory performance for extreme levels of PE and lower memory for middle levels of PE. In this study, we tested the framework by using a gradual manipulation of the strength of association between scenes and objects to render different levels of PE and then tested for item memory of the (mis)matching events. In two experiments, in contrast to what was anticipated, recognition memory for object identity followed an inverted U-shape as a function of PE, with higher performance for intermediate levels of PE. Furthermore, in two additional experiments, we showed the relevance of explicit predictions at encoding to reveal such an inverted U pattern, thus providing the boundary conditions of the effect. We discussed our findings in light of existing literature relating PE and episodic memory, pointing out the potential roles of uncertainty in the environment, and the importance of the cognitive operations underlying encoding tasks.

Generating predictions about environmental regularities, relying on these predictions, and updating these predictions when there is a violation from incoming sensory evidence are considered crucial functions of our cognitive system for being adaptive in the future. The violation of a prediction can result in a prediction error (PE) which affects subsequent memory processing. In our preregistered studies, we examined the effects of different levels of PE on episodic memory. Participants were asked to generate predictions about the associations between sequentially presented cue-target pairs, which were violated later with individual items in three PE levels, namely low, medium, and high PE. Hereafter, participants were asked to provide old/new judgments on the items with confidence ratings, and to retrieve the paired cues. Our results indicated a better recognition memory for low PE than medium and high PE levels, suggesting a memory congruency effect. On the other hand, there was no evidence of memory benefit for high PE level. Together, these novel and coherent findings strongly suggest that high PE does not guarantee better memory.

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