Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThis paper studies the probability of receiving employer-paid training and training independently of who finance it for permanent and temporary workers in Chile. We use data from the Social Protection Survey, EPS, which allow us to construct a panel of workers with information from 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2009. Our results suggest that having a temporary contract in Chile reduces the probability of receiving employer-paid training. We also find that this deficit is not compensated by other types of training. This finding is important for two reasons. First, the proportion of temporary workers that obtain an open-ended contract is low. Second, the productivity growth in Chile after 1997 is practically zero and human capital accumulation is one of the factors that might help to recover the path of productivity growth.

This paper studies the effect of mandated employer-provided child care on the wages of women hired in large firms in Chile. We use a unique employer-employee database from the country's unemployment insurance (UI) system containing monthly information for all individuals that started a new contract between January 2005 and March 2013. We estimate the impact of the program using regression discontinuity design (RDD) exploiting the fact that child care provision is mandatory for all firms with 20 or more female workers. The results indicate that monthly starting wages of the infra-marginal woman hired in a firm with 20 or more female workers are between 9 and 20 percent below those of female workers hired by the same firm when no requirement of providing child care was imposed.

This paper evaluates the impact of a training voucher programme in Chile, called Bono Trabajador Activo, on two labour market outcomes: monthly earnings and employment probabilities. Using detailed administrative datasets of the National Employment Service and the unemployment insurance system, we combine matching and difference‐in‐difference estimators to measure these effects up to five years after the application to the programme. Our main results indicate that the voucher has an overall positive impact on earnings, on the order of 3.2 per cent, and a small negative impact on formal employment. We find that the programme particularly improves earnings for less educated workers.

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