American mink and ferret are highly susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), but no information is available for other mustelid species. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very efficiently within mink farms once introduced, by direct and indirect contact, high within-farm animal density increases the chance for transmission. Between-farm spread is likely to occur once SARS-CoV-2 is introduced, short distance between SARS-CoV-2 positive farms is a risk factor. As of 29 January 2021, SARS-CoV-2 virus has been reported in 400 mink farms in eight countries in the European Union. In most cases, the likely introduction of SARS-CoV-2 infection into farms was infected humans. Human health can be at risk by mink-related variant viruses, which can establish circulation in the community, but so far these have not shown to be more transmissible or causing more severe impact compared with other circulating SARS-CoV-2. Concerning animal health risk posed by SARS-CoV-2 infection the animal species that may be included in monitoring plans are American mink, ferrets, cats, raccoon dogs, white-tailed deer and Rhinolophidae bats. All mink farms should be considered at risk of infection; therefore, the monitoring objective should be early detection. This includes passive monitoring (in place in the whole territory of all countries where animals susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 are bred) but also active monitoring by regular testing. First, frequent testing of farm personnel and all people in contact with the animals is recommended. Furthermore randomly selected animals (dead or sick animals should be included) should be tested using reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), ideally at weekly intervals (i.e. design prevalence approximately 5% in each epidemiological unit, to be assessed case by case). Suspected animals (dead or with clinical signs and a minimum five animals) should be tested for confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Positive samples from each farm should be sequenced to monitor virus evolution and results publicly shared.

BackgroundVaricella is generally considered a mild disease. Disease burden is not well known and country-level estimation is challenging. As varicella disease is not notifiable, notification criteria and rates vary between countries. In general, existing surveillance systems do not capture cases that do not seek medical care, and most are affected by underreporting and underascertainment. We aimed to estimate the overall varicella disease burden in Europe to provide critical information to support decision-making regarding varicella vaccination.MethodsWe conducted a systematic literature review to identify all available epidemiological data on varicella IgG antibody seroprevalence, primary care and hospitalisation incidence, and mortality. We then developed methods to estimate age-specific varicella incidence and annual number of cases by different levels of severity (cases in the community, health care seekers in primary care and hospitals, and deaths) for all countries belonging to the European Medicines Agency (EMA) region and Switzerland.ResultsIn the absence of universal varicella immunization, the burden of varicella would be substantial with a total of 5.5 million (95% CI: 4.7–6.4) varicella cases occurring annually across Europe. Variation exists between countries but overall the majority of cases (3 million; 95% CI: 2.7–3.3) would occur in children <5 years. Annually, 3–3.9 million patients would consult a primary care physician, 18,200–23,500 patients would be hospitalised, and 80 varicella-related deaths would occur (95% CI: 19–822).ConclusionsVaricella disease burden is substantial. Most cases occur in children <5 years old but adults require hospitalisation more often and are at higher risk of death. This information should be considered when planning and evaluating varicella control strategies. A better understanding of the driving factors of country-specific differences in varicella transmission and health care utilization is needed. Improving and standardizing varicella surveillance in Europe, as initiated by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), is important to improve data quality to facilitate inter-country comparison.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12879-017-2445-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Between 3 December 2022 and 1 March 2023 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, was reported in Europe in domestic (522) and wild (1,138) birds over 24 countries. An unexpected number of HPAI virus detections in sea birds were observed, mainly in gull species and particularly in black-headed gulls (large mortality events were observed in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy). The close genetic relationship among viruses collected from black-headed gulls suggests a southward spread of the virus. Moreover, the genetic analyses indicate that the virus persisted in Europe in residential wild birds during and after the summer months. Although the virus retained a preferential binding for avian-like receptors, several mutations associated to increased zoonotic potential were detected. The risk of HPAI virus infection for poultry due to the virus circulating in black-headed gulls and other gull species might increase during the coming months, as breeding bird colonies move inland with possible overlap with poultry production areas. Worldwide, HPAI A(H5N1) virus continued to spread southward in the Americas, from Mexico to southern Chile. The Peruvian pelican was the most frequently reported infected species with thousands of deaths being reported. The reporting of HPAI A(H5N1) in mammals also continued probably linked to feeding on infected wild birds. In Peru, a mass mortality event of sea lions was observed in January and February 2023. Since October 2022, six A(H5N1) detections in humans were reported from Cambodia (a family cluster with 2 people, clade 2.3.2.1c), China (2, clade 2.3.4.4b), Ecuador (1, clade 2.3.4.4b), and Vietnam (1, unspecified clade), as well as two A(H5N6) human infections from China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe is assessed as low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.

The number of measles cases declined in European Union/European Economic Area countries and the United Kingdom in 2020. Reported cases to The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control decreased from 710 to 54 between January and May. Epidemic intelligence screening observed a similar trend. Under-diagnoses and under-reporting during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic should be ruled out before concluding reduced measles circulation is because of social distancing and any community control measures taken to control COVID-19.

Between 2 March and 28 April 2023, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5Nx) virus, clade 2.3.4.4b, outbreaks were reported in domestic (106) and wild (610) birds across 24 countries in Europe. Poultry outbreaks occurred less frequently compared to the previous reporting period and compared to spring 2022. Most of these outbreaks were classified as primary outbreaks without secondary spread and some of them associated with atypical disease presentation, in particular low mortality. In wild birds, black-headed gulls continued to be heavily affected, while also other threatened wild bird species, such as the peregrine falcon, showed increased mortality. The ongoing epidemic in black-headed gulls, many of which breed inland, may increase the risk for poultry, especially in July-August, when first-year birds disperse from the breeding colonies. HPAI A(H5N1) virus also continued to expand in the Americas, including in mammalian species, and is expected to reach the Antarctic in the near future. HPAI virus infections were detected in six mammal species, particularly in marine mammals and mustelids, for the first time, while the viruses currently circulating in Europe retain a preferential binding for avian-like receptors. Since 13 March 2022 and as of 10 May 2023, two A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b virus detections in humans were reported from China (1), and Chile (1), as well as three A(H9N2) and one A(H3N8) human infections in China. The risk of infection with currently circulating avian H5 influenza viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe remains low for the general population in the EU/EEA, and low to moderate for occupationally or otherwise exposed people.