There is considerable overlap between phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions. In this paper, we first review major phenomenological accounts of delusions, beginning with Jaspers' ideas regarding incomprehensibility, delusional mood, and disturbed "cogito" (basic, minimal, or core self-experience) in what he termed "delusion proper" in schizophrenia. Then we discuss later studies of decontextualization and delusional mood by Matussek, changes in self and world in delusion formation according to Conrad's notions of "apophany" and "anastrophe", and the implications of ontological transformations in the felt sense of reality in some delusions. Next we consider consistencies between: a) phenomenological models stressing minimal-self (ipseity) disturbance and hyperreflexivity in schizophrenia, and b) recent neurocognitive models of delusions emphasizing salience dysregulation and prediction error. We voice reservations about homogenizing tendencies in neurocognitive explanations of delusions (the "paranoia paradigm"), given experiential variations in states of delusion. In particular we consider shortcomings of assuming that delusions necessarily or always involve "mistaken beliefs" concerning objective facts about the world. Finally, we offer some suggestions regarding possible neurocognitive factors. Current models that stress hypersalience (banal stimuli experienced as strange) might benefit from considering the potential role of hyposalience in delusion formation. Hyposalience -associated with experiencing the strange as if it were banal, and perhaps with activation of the default mode network -may underlie a kind of delusional derealization and an "anything goes" attitude. Such an attitude would be conducive to delusion formation, yet differs significantly from the hypersalience emphasized in current neurocognitive theories.

The notion of ‘bizarre delusion' has come into question in contemporary anglophone psychopathology. In DSM-5, it no longer serves as a special criterion for diagnosing schizophrenia nor as an exclusion criterion for delusional disorder. Empirical studies influencing this development have, however, been relatively sparse and subject to methodological criticism. Major reviews have concluded that current conceptualizations of bizarre delusions may require rethinking and refinement. Defining bizarreness entails a return to Jaspers, whose influential views on the supposed incomprehensibility of bizarre delusions and schizophrenic experience are more nuanced than is generally recognized. Jaspers insisted we must ‘get behind' three ‘external characteristics' (extraordinary conviction, imperviousness, impossible content) in order to acknowledge a ‘primary experience traceable to the illness' in the ‘delusions proper' of schizophrenia. He also denied that one could empathize with or otherwise ‘understand' this basis. Here, we focus on three features of bizarre delusions that Jaspers foregrounded as illustrating schizophrenic incomprehensibility: disturbance of the cogito, certitude combined with inconsequentiality, delusional mood. We link these with the contemporary ipseity disturbance model of schizophrenia, arguing that Jaspers' examples of incomprehensibility can be understood as manifestations of the three complementary aspects of ipseity-disturbance: diminished self-presence, hyperreflexivity and disturbed grip/hold. We follow Jaspers' lead in acknowledging a distinctive strangeness that defies ready comprehension, but we challenge the absolutism of Jaspers' skepticism by offering a phenomenological account that comprehends bizarreness in two ways: rendering it psychologically understandable, and fitting the various instances of bizarreness into a comprehensive explanatory framework.

Background: The EAWE (Examination of Anomalous World Experience) is a newly developed, semi-structured interview that aims to capture anomalies of subjectivity, common in schizophrenia spectrum disorders, that pertain to experiences of the lived world, including space, time, people, language, atmosphere, and certain existential attitudes. By contrast, previous empirical studies of subjective experience in schizophrenia have focused largely on disturbances in self-experience. Aim: To assess the reliability of the EAWE, including internal consistency and interrater reliability. Sampling and Methods: In the course of developing the EAWE, two distinct studies were conducted, one in the United States and the other in Slovenia. Thirteen patients diagnosed with schizophrenia spectrum or mood disorders were recruited for the US study. Fifteen such patients were recruited for the Slovenian study. Two live interviewers conducted the EAWE in the US. The Slovenian interviews were completed by one live interviewer with a second rater reviewing audiorecordings of the interview. Internal consistency and interrater reliability were calculated independently for each study, utilizing Cronbach's α, Spearman's ρ, and Cohen's κ. Results: Each study yielded high internal consistency (Cronbach's α >0.82) and high interrater reliability for total EAWE scores (ρ > 0.83; average κ values were at least 0.78 for each study, with EAWE domain-specific κ not lower than 0.73). Conclusion: The EAWE, containing world-oriented inquiries into anomalies in subjective experience, has adequate reliability for use in a clinical or research setting.