The degrees of freedom problem is often posed by asking which of the many possible degrees of freedom does the nervous system control? By implication, other degrees of freedom are not controlled. We give an operational meaning to "controlled" and "uncontrolled" and describe a method of analysis through which hypotheses about controlled and uncontrolled degrees of freedom can be tested. In this conception, control refers to stabilization, so that lack of control implies reduced stability. The method was used to analyze an experiment on the sit-to-stand transition. By testing different hypotheses about the controlled variables, we systematically approximated the structure of control in joint space. We found that, for the task of sit-to-stand, the position of the center of mass in the sagittal plane was controlled. The horizontal head position and the position of the hand were controlled less stably, while vertical head position appears to be no more controlled than joint motions.

The overall goal of this target article is to demonstrate a mechanism for an embodied cognition. The particular vehicle is a much-studied, but still widely debated phenomenon seen in 7–12 month-old-infants. In Piaget's classic “A-not-B error,” infants who have successfully uncovered a toy at location “A” continue to reach to that location even after they watch the toy hidden in a nearby location “B.” Here, we question the traditional explanations of the error as an indicator of infants' concepts of objects or other static mental structures. Instead, we demonstrate that the A-not-B error and its previously puzzling contextual variations can be understood by the coupled dynamics of the ordinary processes of goal-directed actions: looking, planning, reaching, and remembering. We offer a formal dynamic theory and model based on cognitive embodiment that both simulates the known A-not-B effects and offers novel predictions that match new experimental results. The demonstration supports an embodied view by casting the mental events involved in perception, planning, deciding, and remembering in the same analogic dynamic language as that used to describe bodily movement, so that they may be continuously meshed. We maintain that this mesh is a pre-eminently cognitive act of “knowing” not only in infancy but also in everyday activities throughout the life span.

Driven by recent empirical studies, we offer a new understanding of the degrees of freedom problem, and propose a refined concept of synergy as a neural organization that ensures a one-to-many mapping of variables providing for both stability of important performance variables and flexibility of motor patterns to deal with possible perturbations and/or secondary tasks. Empirical evidence is reviewed, including a discussion of the operationalization of stability/flexibility through the method of the uncontrolled manifold. We show how this concept establishes links between the various accounts for how movement is organized in redundant effector systems.

We describe an uncontrolled manifold hypothesis, which suggests a particular solution for the notorious problem of motor redundancy. A body of recent experiments supports the uncontrolled manifold hypothesis and shows its ability to discover biological strategies of the coordination of apparently redundant motor systems. The hypothesis and associated computational apparatus have great potential for application in the areas of motor rehabilitation and motor skill acquisiton.