Many academic accountants have explicit or implicit motivations to publish their research in the best journals in the discipline. However, whether the chances of success are better at some of these journals is unknown. This paper examines the archival record to find differences within the authorship of three such publications (The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics) over a recently completed 20-year period. The journals do not differentiate according to the authors' doctoral training, but are differently sensitive to place of faculty employment. The journals are equally receptive to non-U.S. authors, but different in their receptivity to recently graduated and frequently appearing authors. Although areas of change over time are noted, both among journals and within each journal itself, the record also shows a good deal of consistency in other relationships over the 20-year period.

SYNOPSIS Restatement disclosures have evolved into two basic categories: reissuances (Big “R”) and revisions (little “r”). A reissuance restatement requires an 8-K filing, whereas a revision restatement can be disclosed in less transparent ways. The high-transparency of a reissuance restatement disclosure (8-K) results in a greater likelihood of negative effects on companies, executives, and auditors (e.g., Plumlee and Yohn 2008; Burks 2010). Determining whether an 8-K filing is required involves judgment regarding materiality of the restatement, thus creating ambiguity as to the correct disclosure method. Such judgment also introduces the potential to opportunistically choose the method of disclosure. We study the restatement disclosure choices of companies to examine whether executive pay structure is associated with disclosure transparency. Using a sample of 1,178 restatements from the years 2004 through 2013, our results show that as the equity proportion of executive pay increases, the likelihood of a high-transparency disclosure decreases. However, as the difference in pay structure between the CEO and CFO increases, the likelihood of a high-transparency disclosure increases. Overall, our results suggest that executive pay structure influences disclosure choice and that pay structure differences between the CEO and CFO may mitigate such influence. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

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