Special interest groups exert a great deal of influence over political outcomes in the United States. Understanding the determining factors for the formation of special interest groups is important. However, the literature has excluded the role of spatial neighbors. This article employs spatial econometric techniques to discriminately analyze the factors determining the number of special interest groups in a state. While geographic location is not a factor, gross state product, state general expenditures, union membership, and the percentage of manufacturing employment relationships between states are crucial in the formation of special interest groups across states.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the long-run impact of federal government healthcare subsidies on the level of entrepreneurship as measured by self-employment. Design/methodology/approach – Using annual healthcare and employment data from 1948 through 1999, the paper empirically examines the relationship between the growth in employer-provided healthcare and the rate of self-employment as a share of the non-agriculture, civilian labor force. Findings – The regression results imply that there is a consistent effect that has appeared over time – where federal healthcare subsidies have disproportionately benefitted larger firms, contributing to the decline in the rate of self-employment, within-firm innovation, and factor mobility over time. Research limitations/implications – The research in this study is limited by the examination of self-employment only and a constant institutional structure across all states, only varying across time for the entire USA. In addition, an empirical study looking at how the value of healthcare benefits have changed over time – vs the sole question in this study that depends upon whether or not an individual is covered or not would be very useful in determining the true effect on an entrepreneur. Social implications – Reducing or removing the layers of healthcare subsidies would bring about an increase in the transparency of the wage-productivity relationship and a more efficient allocation of labor and entrepreneurial ability across firm sizes. Originality/value – This paper presents empirical evidence supporting specific improvements to national healthcare policy at a time when such policy is undergoing significant change with consequences for entrepreneurial decision making.

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Recent research has identified important policy differences between voter initiative states and pure representative states despite a lack of enough observable voter initiative campaigns to explain the policy differences. This paper investigates the indirect effects of the voter initiative process on legislative production by estimating the number of bills enacted in the American states. The results indicate that legislators in voter initiative states enact more legislation as the difficulty in qualifying a voter initiative for the ballot decreases, as the legislature is less able to alter the effects of successful voter initiatives, and as the average number of voter initiatives that appear on the ballot increases. These results provide some statistical evidence of the indirect effect of the voter initiative and are consistent with the theory that policy differences in voter initiative states are the result of the indirect effect of the voter initiative process.

Although a great deal of research examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the state legislature, the consequences for the state executive branch have been largely ignored. The voter initiative process provides the governor with a method to circumvent the legislature, which may increase the power of the governor in theory. However, it also provides citizens with a means to bypass the traditional lawmaking process and avoid the governor's veto. This may reduce the power of the governor and lead to policies farther from the preferences of the governor. This study examines the impact of the voter initiative process on the power of the state governor by estimating total election cycle spending. Campaign expenditures are expected to reflect any sustained gain or loss in power due to the availability of the voter initiative process. The results indicate that gubernatorial campaign expenditures are significantly lower in states in which the voter initiative process is available. This finding suggests that state governors sustain a loss in political power when the voter initiative is available. Additionally, the findings imply that individuals may employ the voter initiative process as a substitute for gubernatorial support.JEL Codes: H1, H7