Prevailing thinking surrounding the politics of secrecy and transparency is biased by assumptions regarding single-party and small coalition governments. Here, the "politics of secrecy" dominates: Leaders delay or resist strong transparency and freedom of information (FOI) policies when they control parliament, and yield to strong laws because of imposition, symbolic ambition, or concessions when they do not. In effect, leaders weigh the benefits of secrecy against gains in monitorial capacity. Their support for strong transparency policies grows as the number of parties in their cabinet rises. So while the costs of surrendering secrecy trump the benefits of strong transparency reforms in single-party governments, in broad multiparty coalitions leaders trade secrecy for tools to monitor coalition "allies." Drawing on vivid international examples, patterns of FOI reform in Latin America, and an in-depth study of FOI in Brazil, this article generates new theoretical insights into transparency and the "politics of monitoring."

More than 100 freedom of information (FOI) laws have been enacted worldwide, nearly half within the last 10 years. Yet these cross-domain, lynchpin transparency measures have received little scholarly attention. This article assesses the 16 FOI measures adopted across Latin America. Is secrecy being surrendered in a region marked by legacies of opacity? Why are some laws fulfilling their de jure potential in practice while others are not? This article aims to achieve 3 general objectives. It analyzes the de jure and de facto strength of Latin American FOI regimes; it exposes critical data-based and methodological challenges in evaluating and comparing transparency laws; and it illustrates how a causal mechanism, driven by the interactive dynamics of legislative balances of power and cabinet compositions, has had a determinate influence in shaping the strength of FOI regimes from adoption to implementation and reform.A wave of transparency policies has swept across Latin America over the last decade or so. Among budget and legislative transparency provisions, political finance disclosure, and open-data portals, freedom of information (FOI) laws occupy a unique space. They are the bedrock of a country's transparency infrastructure, guaranteeing the right to access public information across policy domains, levels, and branches of government. Now, a decade since the first FOI laws took effect, 16 countries across Latin America have adopted measures, and only a few have yet to do so. As with most of the 100 comprehensive FOI laws now in existence, however, we know very little about whether the de facto operation of these laws has fallen in line with their de jure legal designs. Is the promise of transparency panning out? In other words, are the textual promises of laws fulfilling their mandates in practice-as per baseline predictions of path dependence theories (Pierson 1995(Pierson , 2000? As laws that give citizens the right to ask and receive information within preestablished time frames and exceptions, FOI laws represent a ground-level indicator for governmental dispositions toward transparency and the public's "right to know." Whether FOI laws function or fail suggests whether the oxygen of democracy is thinning or thickening.

How well is Brazil’s access to information (ATI) law working five years after passage? And what can be done to improve it? Drawing on official data as well as nine evaluations of compliance with ATI obligations, interviews with policymakers, and archival research, this paper provides descriptive and inferential statistics on compliance with ATI requests and indicators of implementation. Results show that less than one in every two requests in Brazil obtains a response from agencies, and more than 50% of requests exceed the time limits established in the law. Evidence of weak commitments to ATI are also illustrated by the paucity of several key indicators of compliance, including statistics on requests, declared commitments to ATI, ATI-specific platforms for making requests, and designated oversight institutions. Brazil urgently needs to invest in greater information management, empowering oversight institutions to implement and adjudicate ATI obligations.

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To what extent do transparency policies generate positive impacts? This seemingly rhetorical question has become the subject of increasing contention, partly because of two research‐based biases. First, researchers have been blinded by metrics and method. Using tools that are often ill suited to gauging the gradual, diffuse, and indirect effects of most transparency policies, research has found—unsurprisingly—spotty evidence of impact. Transparency studies would benefit from greater use of complementary approaches, such as careful tracing of impact processes and indicators, combined with sensible counterfactual reasoning. Second, researchers have been looking for impact with blinkered vision. In particular, a thematic fixation on accountability and participation has monopolized attention. Key preconditions—such as compliance with and implementation of transparency policies—remain relatively neglected, as do other areas of potential impact, including capacity building, how actors are leveraging previously restricted streams of information, and transparency's role in improving policy coordination and communication.