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Fossil fuel importers can apply various climate and trade taxes to encourage fossil fuel-dependent countries to cooperate on climate mitigation, and fossil fueldependent countries can respond with alternative diversification and cooperation strategies. This paper runs macroeconomic model simulations of alternative strategies that the global community and fossil fueldependent countries can pursue to encourage and enable their participation in a global low-carbon transition. The following are the findings from the simulations. (i) Fuel importers' unilateral carbon taxes capture fossil fuel-dependent countries' resource rents and accelerate their emission-intensive diversification.(ii) Border taxes on the carbon content of imports from fossil fuel-dependent countries do not induce comprehensive cooperation, but broader trade sanctions do.

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