No abstract

In many global cities the rental housing market is partially regulated. We document that the Paris housing market is dual: a flexible rent sector coexists with a large controlled rent sector. The two sectors have very different rent gradients towards the center of the agglomeration. We develop a model explicitly accounting for these features which allows to investigate general equilibrium effects of rent controls at the city level. In this framework the coexistence of a controlled and flexible rent sector increases the spatial misallocation of households. This mismatch can generally be alleviated by an improvement in urban transport infrastructures.

We build a tractable model of frictional labor markets and segmented housing markets to study welfare effects of regulations, including spatial misallocation and deviation from competitive pricing of rents. The model is summarized by a labor demand curve depending on rents and wages, a wage curve reflecting labor market tightness and rents, and finally a rent curve reflecting employment. In this economy, the rent gradient in the flexible rent sector is higher than in a purely competitive housing market. This leads to spatial misallocation due to some employees commuting too much and some non-employed living inefficiently close to jobs. In turn, reducing generalized commuting costs reduces the rent gradient in the flexible rent sector and the cost of spatial misallocation of workers. The reduction in market rents is maximal when labor markets are less frictional and housing markets are more frictional, and welfare gains are larger when both are more efficient.

Social Scientists and policy makers need precise data on market rents. Yet, while housing prices are systematically recorded, few accurate data sets on rents are available. In this paper, we present a new data set describing local rental markets in France based on online ads collected through to webscraping. Comparison with alternate sources reveals that online ads provide a non biased picture of rental markets and allow coverage of the whole territory. We then estimate hedonic models for prices and rents and document the spatial variations in rent-price ratios. We show that rents do not increase as much as prices in the tightest housing markets. We use our dataset to estimate the market rent of each transaction and of social dwellings. In the latter case,this allows us to estimate the in-kind benefit received by social tenants which is mainly driven by the level of private rent in their municipality.