As a non-productive activity, environmental information disclosure is not only a prerequisite for environmental governance and sustainable development of listed companies, but also an effective means for executives to relieve pressure on business performance. Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as research samples, the authors have carried out an empirical study to test the relationship between subsidiary performance pressure and environmental information disclosure in enterprise groups, and examines the moderating effect of the parent company's shareholding on the main effect, as well as the differentiation of the moderating effect between high and low degree of executives' synergy allocation level in parent-subsidiary corporations. The results show that: firstly, the performance pressure of listed companies has a positive impact on environmental information disclosure; secondly, the parent company's shareholding will weaken the positive impact of listed company's performance pressure on environmental information disclosure. The higher the parent company's shareholding ratio, the weaker the positive impact of subsidiary company's performance pressure on environmental information disclosure. Thirdly, when the degree of executives' synergy allocation level in parent-subsidiary corporations is low, the negative moderating effect of parent's shareholding ratio is stronger.

Within fierce market competition, economic integration acceleration, information technology development, customer demands that are more complex than ever before and product life cycle acceleration have greatly increased the complexity and uncertainty of the operating environment of Chinese private listed companies. Considering the special situation and the current situation of the enterprise development phase in China, the shaping and upgrading of sustainable innovation capability for Chinese private listed companies has become an important issue of common concern in academia and practice. Using 4833 sets of data from private listed companies in China in four consecutive years, we studied the relationship between board governance, sustainable innovation capability and firm expansion empirically based on stewardship theory and principal-agent theory. The results show that centralized leadership structure formed by chief executive officer (CEO) duality has a positive effect on the sustainable innovation capability of Chinese listed companies; director compensation incentive has a positive impact on the sustainable innovation capability of Chinese listed companies; sustainable innovation capability has a positive effect on the firm expansion of Chinese listed companies; and centralized board leadership structure and director compensation incentive have a positive impact on the firm expansion of listed companies partially by improving the sustainable innovation capability.

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Under the dynamic competition situation, the innovation competition interaction between enterprises will take the form of mutual responding, while the formulation and implementation of responsive innovation strategy will be influenced by both shareholders and managers in the principal–agent relationship. In our research, we try to understand how the difference of governance logic between shareholders and managers affects innovation interaction strategy of enterprises. In order to achieve this research goal, this study takes all eligible listed companies (from 2007 to 2016) in China’s stock market as samples. The results show that the parent company shareholding has a negative impact on the subsidiary responsive innovation, while companies whose managers hold more shares select the relatively positive strategy responsive innovation. Moreover, the degree of separation between ownership and control rights and the external institutional environment can moderate the above relationship. Relevant conclusions can provide some reference value for the formulation of responsive innovation decision of listed companies and provide new insights for the design of parent–subsidiary corporate governance structure and the design of managerial equity incentive mechanism in the context of corporate group governance.