Suppose you decided to read Douglas Edwards's book on properties. You pick it up from the shelf and notice that its cover is pink. What is the property of being pink? In order to explain what properties-such as pinkness-are, do we need to accept the existence of some abstract entities we call universals or can properties be explained in terms of classes of objects? Edwards explains, in Chapter 1, that his methodology in giving an account of the nature of properties is fi rst to acknowledge the roles properties play in metaphysics and semantics as well as some other areas of philosophy, and then work toward an account which accommodates these various roles. The metaphysical roles of properties are that they are things that different objects have in common, they mark genuine similarities, and they ground the causal powers of objects. The semantic role of properties is that they serve as the semantic values of predicates and abstract singular terms (10-11). Using the above methodology, and with careful considerations of arguments for and against each theory, Edwards explains and discusses theories of universals (transcendent and immanent versions) in Chapter 2, the trope theory in Chapter 3, an eliminativist theory of properties in Chapter 4, a variety of nominalist theories in Chapter 5, and fi nally pluralist theories of properties in Chapter 6. Edwards provides a useful chart at the end of his book which displays the various strengths and weaknesses of each theory of properties. In Chapter 6, Edwards suggests that a pluralist approach to properties is, all things considered, a better account than others. All of the other accounts, Edwards argues, fail to account satisfactorily for at least one of the philosophical roles properties play, even though these theories may give adequate accounts of some of the other roles of properties. Given that "it would be defeatist about the ability of philosophical theory to give us everything we thought a theory of properties needed" (114), Edwards argues that a pluralist approach fares best because it is able to accommodate all of the features of properties, without, at the same time, proliferating the number of primitives. On the pluralist approach to properties, by appeal to David Lewis, a distinction is made between properties understood as classes: abundant versus natural (sparse) properties. Abundant properties are classes which are not restricted with respect to their composition. There is a class for every predicate, regardless of whether a predicate describes any signifi cant similarity between objects in the world. Natural properties are classes which are restricted in the sense that they contain objects that are similar to each other in ways that objects are naturally found to be similar in reality. Abundant properties explain the semantic roles properties play, while natural properties explain the metaphysical roles properties play (115-117). On the assumption that metaphysics is descriptive, that it "accounts for the ontology seemingly entailed by our everyday thoug...

This thesis is an examination of Bertrand Russell's realist 'bundle theory of particulars.' In Russell's earlier work, the need to explain the unity and individuality of objects compelled him to accept particulars as well as universals as ultimate kinds of reality. Neve1theless, in carrying out his efforts to economize his ontology, he discovered he could not reduce properties to particulars, because there are some relations that resist nominalistic explanation, but particulars could be reduced to bundles of qualities. In this thesis, I show that the realist 'bundle theory' not only reduces the kinds of ultimate reality to one, i.e., to universal qualities, but also serves all of the purposes for which bare particulars were originally required. Specifically. I examine what I take to be the major criticisms leveled against the realist 'bundle theory': the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity. I defend the strength and consistency of Russell's theory and argue that it can answer to the objections. I\I THANK 'Annem', Halide and 'Babam', ismail Ko<;, my parents, who supported me in any way they could. My mom came to visit me three times in the cold Canadian winters just so I could get my thesis work done.Duncan Maclean, my 'friend-for-life', another name for a husband or wife in Turkish, who has always been there for me with his love and support. I especially thank him for creating the ultimate conditions at home for me to finish my thesis in the last month.My dear Professor Nicholas Griffin, who has been a very good supervisor to me. I have learned a lot from his corrections and comments on my work and from our discussions. At times that I was frustrated with my work, it was always my respect for him and the desire not to disappoint him that kept me working.My second reader, Prof. Peter Loptson, who has put a lot of effort into correcting and commenting my drafts. He is a very kind person as well as a very good philosopher.My third reader, Prof. Richard Arthur, who has not only corrected and commented on my drafts, but also been an excellent employer (chair), during most of the time I studied in our department as a PhD student. He is a wise and witty professor.My dear friends, 'Dostum', Ebru Girgin Orhangazili, for her unrelenting, long-distance support that helped me keep afloat on foreign waters.Claudia and Joseph Emerson, for her moral support throughout the years and his technical help with computer issues.Gogo Rashmika Pandya, for her friendship and belief in me and the things I could achieve.Dr. Diane Enns, for her friendship, generosity and guidance. Dr. Brain Garrett, for his comments on one my chapters and his advice about the academic world.Jolen Gallagher, for her friendship, care, and moral support. with special reference to his bundle theory of particulars. My aim is to defend Russell's version of bundle theory from some impo1tant objections. The objections I will deal with in detail are ones that are generally directed against realist bundle theori...

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract