PurposeThe purposes of this paper are to analyze whether digital finance can contribute to enterprises' innovation performance and to determine the mediating effect of government subsidies.Design/methodology/approachThis paper empirically examines the impacts of digital finance on enterprises' innovation performance by looking at Chinese companies listed on the SME and GEM boards from 2011 to 2018 to build an econometric model to test our hypotheses. The mediating effect of government subsidies, the moderating effect of financial constraints are examined, as well as shareholding of the largest shareholders in each selected company and the asset-liability ratio.FindingsThe results show that digital finance has a significant promotional effect on firms' innovation performance and that government subsidies play a partial mediating role in digital finance's contribution to firms' innovation performance. In addition, financial constraints and the shareholding of the largest shareholders in each selected company have a negative moderating effect on the relationship between government subsidies and firms' innovation performance. On the contrary, the asset-liability ratio is found to positively affect the relationship.Originality/valueThere has been limited research to date on the relationship between digital finance and firms' innovation performance, particularly with regard to the extent to which digital finance can influence innovation performance and the mechanisms for doing so. Therefore, it is of great significance to examine the relationship between digital finance and enterprises' innovation performance, which can also provide guidance for both the Chinese government and enterprises.
Policy-oriented financing guarantee schemes are widely adopted in the world to alleviate the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, the development level of policy-oriented financing guarantee market in China has not reached the desired high-level equilibrium target, even though governments have issued a series of guiding policies. Accordingly, based on the evolutionary game theory, this study establishes and analyzes the game model between local governments, guarantee institutions, and banks. Then, the breakthrough effects of different paths on the low-level equilibrium of the guarantee market are simulated. The results show that strengthening superior government's performance appraisal intensity can only partially delay the “window period” of the low-level equilibrium, while adjusting local governments' compensation coefficients or increasing banks' risk sharing ratio have further synergistic effects on the realization of the high-level equilibrium. Additionally, dynamic reward and penalty mechanism of the local governments can effectively restrain the unbalanced state of financing guarantee market caused by banks' excess compensation risk, and finally impel the stabilization of the high-level equilibrium state.
Although local governments have issued relevant reward and penalty policies, there are still problems of medical waste disposal in China, particularly in light of the special situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, these problems are generated in the game between local governments and disposal enterprises. Accordingly, based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes and analyzes the game system between local governments and disposal enterprises under four modes: static reward and static penalty, dynamic reward and static penalty, static reward and dynamic penalty, and dynamic reward and dynamic penalty. The theoretical analysis is verified through numerical simulation of a medical waste disposal case in China. The results showed that when local governments choose the static reward and static penalty mode, the game system hardly always has an evolutionary stable state, and the dynamic reward or dynamic penalty mode can make up for the shortcomings of the static reward and static penalty mode. The static reward and dynamic penalty mode is considerably better than the other two dynamic reward and penalty modes, which has the best effect on improving the quality of medical waste disposal. Additionally, if the reward or penalty increases dynamically, local governments tend to implement a “relaxed supervision” strategy, and disposal enterprises will still improve the disposal quality of medical waste. The suggestions proposed based on the research conclusions offer some enlightenment for policymakers to formulate reasonable reward and penalty measures.
In the post-pandemic era, the continuous growth in the rate of medical waste generation and the limited capacity of traditional disposal methods have posed a double challenge to society and the environment. Resource-based disposal is considered an efficient approach for solving these problems. Previous studies focused on the methods of medical waste disposal and the behavior of single stakeholders, lacking consideration of cooperation among different stakeholders. This study establishes an evolutionary game model of the resource-based disposal of medical waste to analyze the behavioral decision evolution of governments, medical institutions, and disposal enterprises. This study also explores the influencing factors in the achievement of the symbiotic state and investigates the conditions that participants need to meet. The results show that joint tripartite cooperation can be achieved when the subsidies and penalties from governments are sufficient, as well as the efficiency of resource-based disposal, which can effectively promote the evolution of the three subjects from the state of “partial symbiosis” to the state of “symbiosis”. However, the resource-based classification level cannot directly change the symbiotic state of the system due to the goal of minimizing cost and risk. When evolutionary subjects have reached the state of “symbiosis”, the improvement in the classification level can enhance the willingness of disposal enterprises to choose the resource-based classification strategy. Under such circumstances, governments reduce their corresponding level of intervention. At this time, the whole system is in a more idealized symbiotic state.
Financing guarantee institutions achieve capital preservation and appreciation through investment, and diversify business risks by purchasing re-guarantee. In order to study the optimal investment and re-guarantee purchase strategies of financing guarantee institutions, the geometric Brownian motion modulated by Markov chain modulation is selected to describe the price process of risk assets, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is constructed based on the utility maximization criterion, and the solutions of optimal investment and re-guarantee purchase strategies are discussed under the exponential utility function. Ultimately, the influence of relevant parameter on optimal strategies is studied by computational experimental simulation method. The results showed that the risk-free interest rate, risk aversion coefficient and guarantee period have significant effects on the optimal investment and reguarantee purchase strategies. The market mechanism only affects the trend of the optimal investment strategy, but has no effect on the optimal re-guarantee purchase strategy. However, the increase of the reguarantee institution's safety loading and the guarantee recovery rate will significantly reduce the reguarantee purchase ratio.INDEX TERMS Financing guarantee institution, Investment, Re-guarantee purchase, Utility
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