Research into the tension between professionalism and commercialism in the accounting profession is inconclusive and warrants greater attention. How to conceptualize and measure these constructs are thus pressing concerns. Using questionnaire data from 1,646 auditors in Sweden, and applying confirmatory factor analysis and structural regression models within a structural equation modeling framework to a measurement model developed by Suddaby et al. (2009), we find little empirical evidence for the existence of the two logics of professionalism and managerialism (i.e., commercialism) as two higher-order latent constructs shared by auditors. However, we find that two sub-elements of the proposed higher-order constructs do discriminate between each other in a way that could indicate two exclusive value statements in the accounting profession connected to the professionalism–commercialism tension; these are the respective emphasis on independence enforcement and client commitment.

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Purpose -The aim of this paper is to investigate how top management is constructed as a good steward of its company at the annual general meeting (AGM) and how accounting is used in the course of this process. Design/methodology/approach -To meet these aims the authors attended 36 AGMs of Swedish listed companies. The interactions that occurred at the AGMs were analysed, using the theory of translation. Findings -One-third of all questions dealt with financial accounting issues, while the majority of the questions concerned non-financial aspects of stewardship, i.e. company's efforts regarding environmental, equality and ethical issues. Research limitations/implications -There is some concern that the complexity of accounting information may make shareholders feel remote from the company. However, AGMs provide a setting where the financial accounts can be complemented with verbal explanations and visual aids. This contextualizes the financial accounts and makes them understandable to an audience that includes many private investors. This contributed to the fact that accounting was discussed, questioned and referred to. Hence, accounting enables the stewardship function of the AGM. Practical implications -Although AGMs have been the subject of criticism, they are still an important part of the corporate governance system. Since AGMs are live events, shareholders are able to pursue a topic with further questions, an option that is not available to other modes of corporate communication. Originality/value -Whereas the AGM has been in the foreground in government inquiries and codes of conduct, it has been largely neglected in accounting research.

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This paper examines how auditors prepare for the annual general meeting (AGM) and how they report their work to the shareholders there. Prior literature has suggested—but not explicitly studied—that the endpoint of an audit is a state of comfort between the auditor and the management and audit committee members, but also is potentially fragile. The fragility can arise from a failure to relay trust to the investor community, which may initiate or increase doubts about the financial report and/or the auditor's independence. We build the case that an AGM is an event to study how the endpoint of an audit engagement is both a state of collective comfort and a fragile state. The analysis is based on ten interviews and three workshops with auditors as well as observations at 67 AGMs. To analyze the field material, the paper draws on Goffman's idea of face‐work, which requires backstage preparations, notably with management, and a front stage performance as an independent auditor to relay trust to the shareholders. The paper details how auditors at the AGM perform as independent verifiers of the management's financial report. Although we recorded that auditors were typically successful in preventing the backstage activities from becoming visible to the shareholders, we found incidents that challenged both the auditors' and the managements' face. In analyzing these incidents, we found that auditors reinforced their image as independent to regain both their own face and the management's face. The management did not take a similar collective responsibility for the auditor's face, which implies that auditors were asymmetrically committed to the management. As a take‐away, the paper discusses how governance mechanisms backstage are linked and can surface front stage at the AGM.