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In this note I present a solution to Kripkenstein's paradox, based on a very simple argument: (1) natural language and rule-following are empirical phenomena; (2) no case has been described, in real life, of a person who behaves as Wittgenstein's or Kripke's fictional character; (3) therefore, the discussion of such a case is completely devoid of interest. I lay out the example of a 'Kripkensteinian apple', which has a normal weight on even days and is weightless on odd days, in order to highlight the contrast between a genuinely empirical perspective, such as that of physics, and the logical-analytical perspective, under which Kripkenstein's paradox has attracted so much attention.KEyWords: Communication; empirical semantics; logical analysis; Ludwig Wittgenstein; Saul Kripke. rEsuMEnEn esta nota presento una solución a la paradoja de Kripkenstein, basada en un argumento sumamente sencillo: (1) el lenguaje natural y el seguimiento de reglas son fenómenos empíricos; (2) no se ha descrito en la vida real ningún caso similar a los personajes ficticios de Wittgenstein y Kripke; (3) por consiguiente, la discusión de un caso semejante carece completamente de interés. Propongo el ejemplo de una "manzana kripkensteiniana", ingrávida los días impares del mes y grávida los pares, para que se vea mejor el contraste entre una perspectiva genuinamente empírica, como la de la física, y la perspectiva lógico-analítica, que ha llevado a dedicar a la paradoja de Kripkenstein tanta atención.

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.