This paper investigates effects of sponsor ownership on the Market Risk (Systematic risk) and the Liquidity Risk using Asian real estate investment trust (REIT) data. Previous literature warns that the sponsored REIT structure may cause the agency problem, and insists that the sponsor ownership management relieves the agency problem. However, our empirical findings show that there is an inverse-U relationship between the sponsor ownership and the two risks (the market risk and the liquidity risk), which indicates that from the risk management perspective, the sponsor ownership management has no effect. This finding can be explained by the fee business model. The sponsor has a motivation for the asset secularization, and an external manager who makes an option contract of performance, acquisition, and divestment fee with REIT has a motivation for the aggressive management style. In particular, the sponsor has the position of both parties in property transactions. In consequence, Asian REITs take a risk of excessive related party transactions. The findings of this study suggest that the REITs' governance and regulations need to be improved for monitoring of the related party transaction (RPT) and the fee contract, in relation to control structure and in a systematical level.

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