In this paper, differences in the assessment of mission risks and mission benefits between operators and members of the management level in the transport helicopter branch of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) are studied. Results were obtained from a risk analysis that was conducted in accordance with RNLAF procedures. The analysis suggests that the two organizational levels have a coherent perception on risks despite their hierarchical position. Perceived measures of controlcontrollability -seem to induce the inclusion or the exclusion of what is appeared to be a risk. The analysis also suggests that risk management tools may obscure these perceptual differences. Risk management tools may therefore not be sufficient to attain safe operations. In discussions and future studies on risk management and on hierarchical differences in risk perception, this is something to take well notice of. Also, managers and others involved in risk management need to recognize the implications of using risk management instruments that are based on simplified models of risk. This research adds to the risk management theory because it connects multidimensional risk theory with actual organizational risk management practice.

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Unmanned aerial systems (UASs) in general and UAS safety in particular have so far received little attention in the science, technology and society (STS) literature. This paper therefore reports on several (military) cases of this relatively new technology, focusing specifi cally on issues of safety. Quite often, safety of technology is considered the result of a rational process -one of a series of rational, often calculative, linear steps. The paper's results suggest that establishing safety in military UASs is very much a social process. Approaching (military) UAS safety from this perspective could perhaps be complementary to more analytical and rational perspectives on safety of this type of technology. Further research is therefore suggested on the implications that social processes can have for safety in UASs. So far, it seems, such a position on safety in technology has been little explored in both the STS and safety literature explicitly.