W e analyz: a scenari.o. wher~ a manufa~t~rer with a traditional channel partner opens up a direct channel In competition WIth the tradItional channel. We first consider that in order to mitigate channel conflict the manufacturer, who chooses wholesale prices as a Stackelberg leader, commits to setting a direct channel retail price that matches the retailer's price in the traditional channel. We find that the specific equal-pricing strategy that optimizes profits for the manufacturer is also preferred by the retailer and customers over other equal-pricing strategies. We next consider the implications of the equal-pricing constraint through a numerical experiment that indicates that the equal-pricing strategy is appropriate as long as the Internet channel is significantly less convenient than the traditional channel. If the Internet channel is of comparable convenience to the traditional channel, then the manufacturer has tremendous incentive to abandon the equal-pricing policy, at great peril to the traditional retailer.

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Most retailers suffer from substantial discrepancies between inventory quantities recorded in the system and stocks truly available to customers. Promising full inventory transparency, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology has often been suggested as a remedy to the problem. We consider inventory record inaccuracy in a supply chain model, where a Stackelberg manufacturer sets the wholesale price and a retailer determines how much to stock for sale to customers. We first analyze the impact of inventory record inaccuracy on optimal stocking decisions and profits. By contrasting optimal decisions in a decentralized supply chain with those in an integrated supply chain, we find that inventory record inaccuracy exacerbates the inefficiencies resulting from double marginalization in decentralized supply chains. Assuming RFID technology can eliminate the problem of inventory record inaccuracy, we determine the cost thresholds at which RFID adoption becomes profitable. We show that a decentralized supply chain benefits more from RFID technology, such that RFID adoption improves supply chain coordination.

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Supply chain finance (SCF) makes the funding of the supply chain more efficient because it extends the financial strengths of buyers to their suppliers. Nevertheless, buyers sometimes struggle to persuade suppliers to adopt SCF quickly. To craft more effective supplier onboarding strategies, buyers need to know which suppliers are likely to adopt SCF faster. Drawing on the theoretical perspective on organizational motivation, we develop a research framework that uncovers the key drivers of supplier adoption speed. Our framework combines efficiency motive drivers, identified by recent analytical studies on SCF, with legitimacy motive drivers, which stem from a supplier's institutional environment and are new to the SCF literature. We test our hypotheses using a unique data set from a leading financial technology platform provider. We find that suppliers with more limited access to financing tend to adopt SCF faster. In addition, suppliers adopt SCF faster if such adoption is associated with more pronounced reductions in their financing costs. Legitimacy motive drivers also impact supplier adoption speed. Specifically, our results suggest that mimetic and normative pressures accelerate the speed at which suppliers adopt SCF, while coercive pressures seem to have such an effect only when the buyer's stakes are high.