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We present a game-theoretic study of the selfish behavior of TCP users when they are allowed to use multiple concurrent TCP connections so as to maximize their goodputs or other utility functions. We refer to this as the TCP connection game. A central question we ask is whether there is a Nash Equilibrium in such a game, and if it exists, whether the network operates efficiently at such a Nash Equilibrium. Combined with the well known PFTK TCP Model [12], we study this question for three utility functions that differ in how they capture user behavior. The bad news is that the loss of efficiency or price of anarchy can be arbitrarily large if users have no resource limitations and are not socially responsible. The good news is that, if either of these two factors is considered, efficiency loss is bounded. This may partly explain why there will be no congestion collapse if many users use multiple connections.

In response to cross-border cybercrime, investigative organs have adopted cross-border criminal forensic measures such as online public extraction, remote electronic data inspection and real-time monitoring, which may violate the principles of data sovereignty and judicial assistance. While promoting the establishment of a cross-border cooperation mechanism, China should establish a new cross-border electronic evidence criminal forensics model by promoting the procedural justification of cross-border search and monitoring measures. To better regulate cross-border criminal forensics activities, it is necessary to improve the cross-border cybercrime procuratorial organs system to intervene in advance and guide investigations.