Most of the human pandemics reported to date can be classified as zoonoses. Among these, there is a long history of infectious diseases that have spread from non-human primates (NHP) to humans. For millennia, indigenous groups that depend on wildlife for their survival were exposed to the risk of NHP pathogens' transmission through animal hunting and wild meat consumption. Usually, exposure is of no consequence or is limited to mild infections. In rare situations, it can be more severe or even become a real public health concern. Since the emergence of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), nobody can ignore that an emerging infectious diseases (EID) might spread from NHP into the human population. In large parts of Central Africa and Asia, wildlife remains the primary source of meat and income for millions of people living in rural areas. However, in the past few decades the risk of exposure to an NHP pathogen has taken on a new dimension. Unprecedented breaking down of natural barriers between NHP and humans has increased exposure to health risks for a much larger population, including people living in urban areas. There are several reasons for this: (i) due to road development and massive destruction of ecosystems for agricultural needs, wildlife and humans come into contact more frequently; (ii) due to ecological awareness, many long distance travelers are in search of wildlife discovery, with a particular fascination for African great apes; (iii) due to the attraction for ancient temples and mystical practices, others travelers visit Asian places colonized by NHP. In each case, there is a risk of pathogen transmission through a bite or another route of infection. Beside the individual risk of contracting a pathogen, there is also the possibility of starting a new pandemic. This article reviews the known cases of NHP pathogens' transmission to humans whether they are hunters, travelers, ecotourists, veterinarians, or scientists working on NHP. Although pathogen transmission is supposed to be a rare outcome, Rabies virus, Herpes B virus, Monkeypox virus, Ebola virus, or Yellow fever virus infections are of greater concern and require quick countermeasures from public health professionals.

Background Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 infection among sheltered homeless and other vulnerable people might provide the information needed to prevent its spread within accommodation centres. Methods Data was obtained from 698 participants in different accommodation centres (411 homeless individuals, 77 asylum-seekers, 58 other persons living in precarious conditions, and 152 employees working in these accommodation centres) who completed questionnaires and had nasal samples collected between 26 March and 17 April 2020. SARS-CoV-2 carriage was assessed by quantitative PCR. Results We found a high (78.9%) acceptance rate toward testing. Overall, 49 (7.0%) people were positive for SARS-CoV-2, including 37 homeless individuals (of 411, 9.0%), 12 employees (of 152, 7.9%). SARS-CoV-2 positivity correlated with symptoms, although 51% of positive patients did not report respiratory symptoms or fever. Among homeless people, being young (18-34 years) (OR: 3.83 [1.47–10.0], p = 0.006) and being housed in one specific shelter (OR: 9.13 [4.09–20.37], p < 0.001) were independent factors associated with the SARS-CoV-2 positivity rates (11.4% and 20.6%, respectively). Discussion Symptom screening alone is insufficient to prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission in the vulnerable sheltered people. Systematic testing should be promoted.

Dogs are occasionally susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, developing few or no clinical signs. Epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in dogs requires testing to distinguish it from other canine coronaviruses. In the last year, significant advances have been made in the diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2, allowing its surveillance in both human and animal populations. Here, using ELISA and automated western blotting (AWB) assays, we performed a longitudinal study on 809 apparently healthy dogs from different regions of France to investigate anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies. There were three main groups: (i) 356 dogs sampled once before the pandemic, (ii) 235 dogs sampled once during the pandemic, and (iii) 218 dogs, including 82 dogs sampled twice (before and during the pandemic), 125 dogs sampled twice during the pandemic and 11 dogs sampled three times (once before and twice during the pandemic). Using ELISA, seroprevalence was significantly higher during the pandemic [5.5% (25/453)] than during the pre-pandemic period [1.1% (5/449)]. Among the 218 dogs sampled twice, at least 8 ELISA-seroconversions were observed. ELISA positive pre-pandemic sera were not confirmed in serial tests by AWB, indicating possible ELISA cross-reactivity, probably with other canine coronaviruses. A significant difference was observed between these two serological tests (Q = 88, p = 0.008). A clear correlation was observed between SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence in dogs and the incidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection in human population from the same area. AWB could be used as a second line assay to confirm the doubtful and discrepant ELISA results in dogs. Our results confirm the previous experimental models regarding the susceptibility of dogs to SARS-CoV-2, suggesting that viral transmission from and between dogs is weak or absent. However, the new variants with multiple mutations could adapt to dogs; this hypothesis cannot be ruled out in the absence of genomic data on SARS-CoV-2 from dogs.