The uncertainty of emergencies makes the emergency procurement face many risks, so the risk management is particularly important of the emergency procurement. The risk attitude of decision makers will significantly affect the decision-making of risk management. In this paper, the risk management problem with different risk attitudes of emergency procurement consisting of dual-source suppliers and the single government is studied, and a government-led Stackelberg game is used to analyze the risks of each link to establish an emergency procurement model under the option contract, and the optimal decision-making is obtained. The effects of reserve period, risk avoidance coefficient, and probability of emergency on optimal decision-making are analyzed with different risk attitude. Moreover, we investigate the coordination of the government-led supply chain coordination under the risk aversion and risk-neutral conditions of emergency supply chain participants. The results show that the model can control the risk while reducing the cost of government procurement and ensuring the revenue of suppliers. Finally, the influence of each parameter on the optimization decision is verified by a numerical example.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
customersupport@researchsolutions.com
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
Copyright © 2025 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.