This article analyses citizenship and political culture in the Faroe Islands based on a quantitative survey carried out in summer 2004. Located theoretically in the tradition of Scandinavian citizenship investigations and its predecessors in the 'civic culture' tradition of Almond and Verba, four areas of citizenship are analysed: political engagement, democratic participation, political efficacy and democratic identity. The main hypothesis is that the character of citizenship in the Faroe Islands is very similar to that found in the Scandinavian countries in general. While most of the results found confirm this hypothesis, there are a number of special features that demand alternative explanations. Thus, the fact that the Faroese score much below the Scandinavian average concerning 'postmodern' forms of political participation like political consumption or boycott of goods, and that gender differences are bigger than in other Scandinavian countries when it comes to female representation in the Faroese parliament and in government, seems better explained by the relative remoteness of the islands from the Scandinavian political and cultural mainstream (the parochialism hypothesis). Also the fact that the Faroese are much less confident in speaking at public meetings, sending letters to newspapers or complaining to authorities than, for example, Danes in general calls for an alternative explanation. As these features go together with much less knowledge about and confidence in the Danish parliament ('Folketinget') and a lower level of efficacy towards the parliament than among Danes in general, the most likely explanation seem to be found in the way in which Danish supremacy has affected political culture in the Faroe Islands (the colonialism hypothesis).

Control of executive power is a central accountability concern. This article focuses on ways for parliament and MPs to assist the voter in this important task. Parliamentary systems empower parliaments by a range of control institutions, but the role of political parties challenges MPs incentives to engage in control of government. This article focuses on Fire Alarm control activity, but argues that Fire Alarms call for MP Firefighting. In parliament, MPs have the opportunity to respond to reports from decentral control institutions about government mal‐administration. Building on models of rational politicians, this paper investigates when MPs in fact engage in Firefighting related to Fire Alarm cases from the Ombudsman and audit institution. The article argues that MPs engage in Firefighting when it serves partisan purposes. The paper relies on a medium‐N dataset of reports from the Faroese Ombudsman and Audit General (52 cases) and applies a mixed‐method research design. The results show that the partisan logic dominates MP Firefighting. Opposition MPs use government mistakes to damage government reputation. However, the paper argues of the possibility of a more parliamentarian outcome, since focus on Fire Alarm cases puts pressure on government to make amends.

Formelle diskussioner til trods, så fungerer det færøske politiske system de facto som et selvstændigt politisk system, der lovgiver, forvalter og tager beslutninger, der påvirker den enkelte færings liv og muligheder. Denne artikel præsenterer en analyse af det færøske politiske system og en introduktion af politiske tendenser. Det færøske politiske system er et eksempel på et parlamentarisk system med et flerpartisystem, men mens de politiske traditioner er veletablerede, så er forvaltningspraksis af nyere dato. Den politiske dagsorden de sidste mange år har været kendetegnet af politisk polarisering i forhold til fordelingsmæssige og værdipolitiske spørgsmål. Samtidig har der udviklet sig en form for sjælden tværpolitisk enighed i forhold til. Danmark, hvor der ønskes og stilles krav om større indflydelse på den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik.

Parliamentary oversight of executive power is a parliamentary system concern, considering weaker ex-post institutional oversight mechanisms and actor incentive challenges. Yet, institutional options are precondition for making parliamentary ex-post oversight work and this article investigates which type of options in fact exists within the vital committee system and how they are designed. The expectation is that ex-post oversight options depend on distributional power structures, being stronger for systems with traditions for minority compared to majority governments. For the design, the expectation is an institutional ‘efficient’ outcome in terms of ex-post oversight options being placed in a controlled central oversight committee, and that this applies regardless of government traditions. Empirically, focus is on the five most similar Nordic state parliamentary cases that vary in committee settings and in government traditions. For the investigation focus is on specific ex-post oversight options, the design of these options and overall de-facto use. The findings show a clear difference between the Scandinavian minority cases and the Icelandic and Finnish majority cases. For the design, most cases have ex-post oversight options designed for specific oversight committees, but where the Danish Folketing deviates by providing several options in different committees.

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