This study proposes an analytical framework for examining factors affecting foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into developing economies, taking Jordan as an example. It uses multivariate VAR analysis to address the relationships of FDI with institutional factors, economic factors, population and financial factors. It thus demonstrates the existence of a significant negative effect of corruption on FDI inflows. However, this effect is substantially alleviated by improving the quality of institutions and good governance in the country. Based on the analysis, the study proposes a number of policies that could assist in attracting FDI. Supportive policies that tend to limit corruption are more likely to enforce the rule of law and good governance, which can contribute positively to attracting FDI. Contribution/ Originality:The study contributes to existing literature and assists policymakers in understanding the effect of corruption on FDI inflows. This is seemingly the first application of an analytical framework to analyse FDI determinants in a small developing economy like Jordan.

This study examines the effects of insurance activity on per capita income in the case of a southern Mediterranean country (Jordan) over the period 1990-2017 using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration analysis to describe the dynamic long relationship between per capita income and insurance activity. It provides empirical evidence that insurance sector activity, measured by insurance investment, had a negative and significant effect on per capita income in Jordan during the studied period. However, it was also found that the negative effects of insurance sector activity on growth were limited by other economic policies which hamper per capita growth, such as inflation. The study recommends that more diversification of insurance products is necessary and that new markets need to be explored in order for insurance companies in southern Mediterranean countries to compete in international markets. Although there are several agreements between Mediterranean countries, negotiations on minimizing restrictions on insurance company activities could be done through easing procedures, reducing costs and enhancing future economic relations by exploring new economic relations or by building on current protocol and trade agreements. Furthermore, the study notes that policymakers in southern Mediterranean countries must aim for a well-developed insurance sector so that its activity can contribute to economic growth through mobilizing national saving to finance long-term investment projects. More attention should be paid throughout the region to insurance sector activities while conducting financial sector analysis and macroeconomic policy design.

No abstract

This paper analyzes the importance of size and capital for risk-taking incentives of Jordanian banks using panel data of 13 commercial banks for the period 2007–2017. The results reveal that size and capital add to stability, consistent with the economies of scale and scope hypothesis. In developing countries, banks are more conservative and less involved in market-based activities; however, they are interconnected just as in developed countries. The results of the first model and second model reveal that as size increases by 1 percent, risk decreases by 0.11 percent and 0.03 percent, respectively, implying that too-big-to-fail is not present and that moral hazard is not a serious issue. In both models, large size is driven by diversification not by risk-taking incentives. In terms of capital, the results of the first model and second model reveal that as capital increases by 1 percent, risk decreases by 0.48 and 0.12 percent, respectively. The fact that Jordanian banks are overcapitalized indicates that the central bank regulation is not binding. Banks increase their capital adequacy ratios to reduce risk. It is clear that there is economic benefit from increased size. However, the failures of large banks are systemic due to their interconnectedness. Therefore, regulators need to pay special attention to them in accordance with Basel III Accord.

No abstract