Network security is a major challenge for big and small companies. The Internet topology is vulnerable to Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks as it provides an opportunity to an attacker to send a large volume of traffic to a victim, which can limit its Internet availability. The main problem in the prevention of the DDoS attack, also known as the flooding attack, is how to find the source of traffic flooding. This is because the spoofed source Internet protocol (IP) address of packets is not affected on its routing. As a result, IP traceback techniques are proposed to find the source of attack and in general, to find the source of any packet. Doing so, the IP traceback techniques can help us to prevent the Denial of Service (DoS) and DDoS attacks. In this paper, we propose an efficient Single Flow IP Traceback (SFT) technique in the Autonomous System (AS) level. Furthermore, a path signature generation algorithm is presented for detecting and filtering the spoofed traffic. Our solution assumes a secure Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)-routing infrastructure for exchanging authenticated messages in order to learn the path signatures, and it uses a marking algorithm in the flow level for transmission of the traceback messages. Because in our technique less bits are required to mark the IP header packet, the required storage space for any unique path to the victim is significantly decreased. Compared with the other existing techniques, the obtained results demonstrate that our technique has the least marking rate, overhead processing on the middle nodes, and destination's computational cost while offering the highest accuracy in tracebacking attack.

Having a doubtless election in the information technology era requires satisfaction and verification of security properties in electronic voting (e-voting) systems. This paper focuses on verification of authentication-type properties of an e-voting protocol. The well-known FOO92 e-voting protocol is analyzed, as a case study, against the uniqueness and eligibility properties and their satisfaction are verified. By means of an automated formal approach, the protocol is modelled in the mCRL2 language, which is a combination of the ACP process algebra language and abstract data types (ADT). Then, the eligibility and uniqueness properties as two authentication-type requirements are modelled in the modal µ-calculus. These are given to a combination of dedicated mCRL2 tools to verify the properties. Our research is valuable due to its direct modelling of authentication-type properties and their verification. The experiment can be easily generalized as a pattern for verification of similar protocols.

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