The purpose of this study is to examines the impacts of auditor tenure on earnings management and if the CEO remuneration moderates this relationship. The sample includes all firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2019 with the exclusion of the financial sector. The fixed-effect model, robustness testing to ensure data integrity and alternative measurements to ensure reliable results were used in this study. After examining the auditor tenure in this study, the study found that there is a negative and significant association with earnings management. In additional, this study showed that the combined influence of CEO compensation and auditor tenure had a negative and significant impact on earnings management. In order to reduce earnings management by decreasing opportunistic behavior and conflicts of interest, this study emphasizes the importance of high CEO compensation and auditor tenure, which is advantageous to investors, shareholders, political, and stakeholders in Jordanian firms as well as auditing firms.

This study investigates the impact of the audit firm size on earnings management by using the CEO compensation as a moderating variable. This study was conducted in service and industrial firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange from 2015 to 2019. The results of this research were examined using a fixed-effect model, and many robustness tests were used to show that the conclusions are reliable when using different measures. The size of the audit company and the management of earnings were shown to be significantly correlated in the research. However, show how the combined effects of CEO remuneration and audit firm size have a considerably detrimental impact on the management of profitability. When making decisions on external audits and earnings management, the government, investors, and shareholders would benefit from this study. It highlights several strengths and flaws in the audit firm size and CEO compensation that aid in restricting earnings management.