This is a PDF file of an article that has undergone enhancements after acceptance, such as the addition of a cover page and metadata, and formatting for readability, but it is not yet the definitive version of record. This version will undergo additional copyediting, typesetting and review before it is published in its final form, but we are providing this version to give early visibility of the article. Please note that, during the production process, errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

No abstract

No abstract

This article focuses on principles of information aggregation in the presence of false, public reports (fake news). The analysis explores news has been having a public goods feature characterized by models of information and economic efficiency. The analysis is not tied to any particular theory about how or why unreliable news emerges. The reports could be purposeful deception, intentions to mislead or profit motivated responses to decision biases of readers. A well-known and widely studied “cascade” experiment is used to illustrate principles that provide links to standard economic models. News is modeled as an aggregation of a simple, fixed chain of decentralized observations and reports about an underlying, unknown state of nature. The personal value of an individual’s decision depends on both the decision and the underlying state of nature. The information about the state used in the decision can reflect private observations or the “news” about the decisions of others. The experiments demonstrate that aggregated information is dependent on accumulated trust in news sources and has value as a special form of public goods.

No abstract