This study conducted to analyze and compare the epidemiological and clinical characteristics of hydrogen fluoride exposed patients based on major burn criteria for the appropriate emergency department (ED) response to a mass casualty chemical spill. This retrospective cross-sectional study included the records of patients (n = 199) who visited the ED of Gumi City University Hospital from September 27, 2012, to October 20, 2012. Subjects were included in the major burn group (MBG) if they presented with wounds that required referral to a burn center according to the American Burn Association guidelines or in the non-major burn group (NMBG) if not. Males were predominant in both the MBG (n = 55, 48 males) and NMBG (n = 144, 84 males; p < 0.05). The most prevalent timeline for visiting the ED was the phase which included 9-32 hours post-leak of HF, including 45 patients (81.8%) in the MBG and 122 patients (84.7%) in the NMBG (p < 0.001). The respiratory tract was the site of greatest damage in patients in both the MBG and NMBG (n=47, 85.5% versus n=142, 98.6%, p < 0.001). Regarding dispositions, all patients in the NMBG were discharged (n=144, 100%); however, 8 patients (14.5%) in the MBG underwent other dispositions (discharge againt medical advice, 5 patients; admission, 1; death, 2, p < 0.05). Patient outcomes after major chemical contamination events should be characterized in future studies to maximize the quality of patient care.

Background This study analyzed the characteristics of hydrogen fluoride-exposed patients (HFEPs) treated in the emergency department (ED) of a local university hospital, and reviewed the hospital’s disaster response according to space, staff, supplies, and systems (4Ss). Methods This retrospective observational chart review and descriptive study included 199 HFEPs among 2588 total ED patients who visited a local university emergency medical center for treatment between September 27, 2012 and October 20, 2012, following a hydrofluoric acid leak at the Hube Globe factory in Gumi City, Republic of Korea. Descriptive results concerning the 4Ss were obtained by interviewing ED specialist staff physicians on duty during the study period. In accordance with American Burn Association criteria, patients requiring burn center referral were assigned to the major burn group (MBG) as severe condition. Results During the acute phase (within 8 h after leak initiation), there were 43 patients in the ED, which was staffed with 3 doctors and 3 nurses, without 4S resources. Of these 43 patients, there were 8 HFEPs (100%) in the MBG and 0 in the non-MBG (NMBG). During the subacute phase (24 h after the acute phase), there were 262 patients in the ED including 167 HFEPs, of whom 45 (26.95%) were in the MBG and 122 (73.05%) were in the NMBG. The ED was then staffed with 6 doctors (3 on day shift and 3 on night shift) and 10 nurses (3 on day shift, 4 on evening shift, and 3 on night shift), and no 4S resources were available. Throughout the study period, no 4Ss were available. First, there was no expansion of ED space or secured disaster reserve beds. Second, there was no increase in manpower with duty time adjustments or duty relocation for ED working personnel. Third, there was no logistics reinforcement (e.g., antidote or personal protective equipment). Fourth, there were no disaster-related measures for the administration department, decontamination zone setup, safety diagnostic testing, or designated disaster triage implementation. Conclusions The hospital’s disaster response was insufficient for all aspects of the 4Ss. Detailed guidance concerning a hospital disaster management plan is required.

Purpose: This study was conducted to identify the clinical characteristics associated with sulfuric acid injury evaluated in emergency department. Method:This study was retrospective multicenter study with sulfuric acid injured patients who were visited in 3 emergency departments during 10 years in South Korea. Data were collected retrospectively from Jan 2006 to Dec 2015 on all sulfuric acid injuries presenting to the 3 emergency departments. Collected data were those of demographic, exposure site, injury mechanism, final diagnosis and hospital care.Result: A total of 46 patients were enrolled. Most of the patients were male (88.5%). The face and eye were the most commonly injured body parts (53.4%) and most commonly injured mechanism was splashing injury (69.5%) in sulfuric acid burn patients. A total of 25 (54.3%) patients were identified as having lesions more than second degree burn.Conclusion: sulfuric acid can cause severe burns to the skin. When working with sulfuric acid, have to wear acid proof protect clothing, goggle and glove. And it is need to pay close attention when working with sulfuric acid.

Objective: This study aimed to analyze the characteristics of hydrogen fluoride–exposed patients (HFEPs) treated at an emergency department (ED) at a local university hospital, and to review the hospital's disaster response according to staff, stuff, space, and system (4Ss).Method: This is retrospective observational chart review and descriptive study included 199 HFEPs among 2628 of total ED patient who visited a local university emergency medical center for treatment between September 27 and October 20, 2012, following an HF leak at the Hub Globe factory in Gumi City, Republic of Korea. Descriptive results concerning 4Ss were obtained from interview with ED specialist staff physician on duty during the study period. According to the criteria of the American Burn Association, patients requiring burn center referral were assigned to the major burn group (MBG) as severe condition. Result: During the first 24 h after the accident, 161 (80.9%) HFEPs were treated in the ED. Among the 55 (27.6%) patients in the MBG, 8 (4% of the HFEPs) came to the ED during the acute phase (within the first 8 h after the leak began). During the acute phase, the ED was staffed with three doctors and three nurses. Among the total 2628 patients in the ED during the study period, 262 (9.97%) patients, including 167 (83.92%) of the 199 HFEPs, were there during the subacute phase, defined as the 24 h after the acute phase. During the subacute phase, the ED staff consisted of six doctors and 10 nurses. No concepts according to 4Ss that allowed for the expansion of ED space with securing disaster reserve beds or an increase in manpower with duty time adjustments or duty relocation for ED working personnel were in place as well as reinforcement of logistics such as antidote or PPE or disaster related measures of administration department or decontamination zone setup or decontamination or disaster related diagnostic testing measures or unification and management of the entrances and exits of hospital or implementation of previously designated disaster triage.Conclusion: Hospital disaster response was insufficient for all aspects of 4Ss. Detailed guidance for hospital disaster management plan establishment is required.

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