not burdened by non-relevant work habits (compare Doležalová, 2014a). Dadgar (2012) maintains that according to Becker's Human Capital Theory, it is optimal for individuals to get a job after completing formal education to make the investment into individual human capital fully beneficial. Scott-Clayton (2012), on the contrary, stresses the concavity of human capital productivity which leads to marginal returns from the work experience. From this point of view, a student's job during termtime can improve their soft skills, career networking and secure references (ibidem). In short, the study-work rate challenges economic theory: if

The economic growth and well-being of the nation increasingly depends on the human capital. In our study we offer original findings based on our survey Talent 2016. We try to identify who the talented students are, which background they did come from and how the family background influenced them. Our paper provides clear evidence of human capital intergenerational transmission. The vertical immobility in the same generation as well as the vertical mobility between generations was observed. Most of the gifted students came from the complete highly educated families with tradition in their field of interest and long positive attitudes toward accumulating the knowledge. Contrarily, the role of the teachers in the support and guidance is negligible. We have shown that there is close relation between the gifted children premature reading ability and the accumulation of the human capital in their families. The same is valid for the attendance of the 8-years grammar schools. Based on our dataset, we do not observe the Galtonian regression toward the mean. For the future economic growth there must be offered a helping hand for the talented children with less educated family background.

In his lecture on the occasion of being awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics for year 2001, Stiglitz spoke out vigorously against the classical economics based on a limited impact of government and markets functioning without government interventions. We do not see the invisible hand of the market, he remarked, because either it 'simply doesn't exist' or 'at least [...] it is palsied' (Stiglitz 2001). In the basic dichotomy between free market and state interventions, Stiglitz stands as a strong critic of neoliberalism and is entirely on the side of state interventions. This view also forms the essential character of his (so far) latest book Euro-How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. The monograph thus does not discuss the origin and development of euro, establishing the monetary union or monetary integration during the Great Recession but is primarily 'about economics and economic ideologies and their interactions with politics' (p. 42). For Stiglitz, the ideology against which he speaks out is the 'unwavering faith in markets' (p. 47), that is, neoliberalism or market fundamentalism (both terms are virtually used as synonyms). For Stiglitz, as an American economist, the common European currency is only an academic opportunity to speak out against the individual aspects of neoliberalism, based on a specific and rather dramatic European case. The book is divided into four parts. The first part (Europe in Crisis) describes the theoretical expectations for the common currency and essential arguments in favour of its adoption; in the third chapter, he provides a concise overview of the development of the eurozone's basic economic markers in comparison to the development of (predominantly) the American economy. In the second part (Flawed from the Start), he explains the conditions under which euro could work. He emphasises that despite the expectations, or rather wishes, of the founders of the monetary union, euro did not lead to higher and more profound integration, but, on the contrary, it contributed to numerous divergences. The last chapter of the second part is devoted to the criticism of European Central Bank's currency policy. The third part (Misconceived Policies) criticises the crisis programmes proposed by the 'Troika' (European Central Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund) during the Greek economic crisis. In the final fourth section (A Way Forward?), he outlines three possible ways of solving the problems of the eurozone. The first (and, in Stiglitz's opinion, the most suitable) way is implementing his proposal of the seven structural reforms of the eurozone. The second option is an 'amicable divorce', illustrated by Greece or Germany leaving the monetary union. Finally, the third option is his concept of the so-called 'flexible euro'. Throughout the monograph Stiglitz keeps emphasising that euro is not an economical project. He reminds that euro 'was a political project, and in the case of any political project, politics matters'. (p.41) and, consequently, it 'was not a...

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