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We examine whether institutional investors affect a firm's commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) for a large sample of firms from 41 countries over the period 2004 through 2013. We focus on environmental and social aspects of CSR, while controlling for firms' governance levels. We find that institutional ownership is positively associated with firm-level environmental and social commitments. Further, the "color of money" matters. Domestic institutional investors and non-U.S. foreign investors account for these positive associations, while U.S. institutional investors' holdings are not related to environmental and social scores. Similarly, higher scores are associated with long-term investors such as pension funds but not with hedge funds. Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment shows that institutional ownership causes improvements in environmental scores. Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors, in aggregate, use their ownership stakes to promote good CSR practices around the world.

This is the unspecified version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. We study whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries. We find that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance. Further, we find that within family groups liquidity shocks are passed on through investment cuts across the group. Our evidence is consistent with families taking actions to increase the likelihood that the firms under their control and their control benefits survive the crisis, at the expense of outside shareholders. (JEL G01, G14, G32) * We study whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis using a sample of more than 8,500 firms from 35 countries. We find that family-controlled firms underperform significantly, they cut investment more relative to other firms, and these investment cuts are associated with greater underperformance. Further, we find that within family groups liquidity shocks are passed on through investment cuts across the group. Our evidence is consistent with families taking actions to increase the likelihood that the firms under their control and their control benefits survive the crisis, at the expense of outside shareholders. (JEL G01, G14, G32) 3 Whether family control is beneficial for all shareholders or serves the family's best interest at the expense of outside shareholders is still unclear, despite much research on this issue. Permanent repository link:1 In this paper, we shed new light on this topic by studying, around the world, whether and how family control affects valuation and corporate decisions during the 2008-2009 financial crisis.We argue that the unexpected liquidity shock from the financial crisis moves firms out of equilibrium in a way that magnifies both the benefits and costs of family control. With liquidity scarce, a family could add value by providing greater access to finance via other firms under its control. However, a family's private benefits of control also can be affected by the crisis. A controlling family tends to be undiversified with its wealth tied up in the firm(s) it controls, and a liquidity shock can threaten the survival of the family empire. Relative to firms controlled by more diversified shareholders, family-controlled firms may be biased toward survival-oriented actions that help preserve the family's control benefits at the expense of outside shareholders.We use a sample of more than 8,500 nonfinancial firms from thirty-five countries to test whether outside shareholders update their expectations regarding the benefit or cost of family control during a financial shock. Our results show that across countries family-controlled firms underperform relative to other firms during the 2008-2009 global fin...