Purpose -This paper contributes to the existing disclosure literature by examining the determinants of narrative risk information in the interim reports for a sample of UK non financial companies.Methodology -This study uses the manual content analysis to measure the level of risk information in interim report narrative sections prepared by 72 UK companies. It also uses the OLS regression analysis to examine the impact of firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms on narrative risk disclosures.Findings -The empirical analysis shows that large firms are more likely to disclose more risk information in the narrative sections of interim reports. In addition, the analysis shows that industry activity type is positively associated with levels of narrative risk disclosure in interim reports. Finally, the analysis shows statistically insignificant impact of other firmspecific characteristics (liquidity, gearing, profitability and cross-listing) and corporate governance mechanisms on narrative risk disclosure.Practical implications -The study's findings have practical implications. It informs investors about the characteristics of UK companies that disclose risk information in their interim reports. For example, the findings shows that narrative risk disclosures is affected by firm size and industry type rather than firms' risk levels (e.g. financing risk measured by the gearing ratio or liquidity risk measured by lower liquidity ratios). Practical implications for managers from these findings are that, in order to keep investors satisfied, companies with high levels of financing and liquidity risks should look at investors' demands for risk disclosure. This will help investors when making their investment decisions.Originality/value -The determinants of narrative risk disclosure in interim reports has not been explored so clearly in prior research and therefore this study is the first of its kind to examine this research issue for a sample of UK companies.

Going beyond the mere participation of female directors within boardrooms, we investigate which of the two major boards of directors' roles (advisory versus monitoring) is best played by female directors in order to make a difference to shareholders. More specifically, we investigate the impact that advisory and monitoring female directors have on managerial opportunism with a specific focus on earnings management. Using sample of US firms, we find evidence suggesting that female directors holding monitoring roles mitigate managerial opportunism, as measured by discretionary accruals. In contrast to the current argument that advisory directors in general are better able to sustain and improve earnings quality, we find no evidence that suggests that advisory female directors are significantly associated with lower managerial opportunism. Overall, the results remain robust after controlling for potential endogeneity problems, corporate governance, and external auditor quality.

Starting from 2006, UK listed companies are required to analyse their performance by using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in specific sections of their annual reports and the UK Accounting Standard Board (ASB) provides companies with guidelines for the best practice regarding KPI disclosure. Motivated by the possible effects of the KPI disclosure quality, we examine their potential economic consequences for a sample of UK listed firms for the period 2006 to 2010. Our sample consists of 448 firm-year observations. We first develop a measure for the quality of the KPI disclosure based on the ASB's guidelines. We then test the economic consequences of financial and nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality both separately and combined into one variable. Our findings, after conducting various sensitivity tests, suggest that only the disclosure quality of financial KPIs matters. We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) relationship between disclosure quality of financial KPIs and the implied cost of capital (firm value). These results inform regulatory bodies as well as the academic literature about the potential economic consequences of this type of disclosure.

Starting from 2006, UK listed companies are required to analyse their performance by using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in specific sections of their annual reports and the UK Accounting Standard Board (ASB) provides companies with guidelines for the best practice regarding KPI disclosure. Motivated by the possible effects of the KPI disclosure quality, we examine their potential economic consequences for a sample of UK listed firms for the period 2006 to 2010. Our sample consists of 448 firm-year observations. We first develop a measure for the quality of the KPI disclosure based on the ASB's guidelines. We then test the economic consequences of financial and nonfinancial KPIs disclosure quality both separately and combined into one variable. Our findings, after conducting various sensitivity tests, suggest that only the disclosure quality of financial KPIs matters. We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) relationship between disclosure quality of financial KPIs and the implied cost of capital (firm value). These results inform regulatory bodies as well as the academic literature about the potential economic consequences of this type of disclosure.