We analyze the control and performance of assets operating in joint ventures (JVs). Control in JVs is determined by the allocation of voting rights and by the contracts that govern the JVs. This hybrid allocation of control seeks to reduce the potential for ex post opportunism. The results suggest that contractual provisions encourage collaboration and improve JV performance when one of the partners accepts a minority position on the board. The analysis also reveals that with the exception of JVs with contractual option provisions, assets operating in our sample of JVs generate higher returns than assets in fully controlled subsidiaries.

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This paper studies the puzzling negative book equity phenomenon among US public firms. Our evidence suggests that negative book equity firms exhibit heterogeneous characteristics. We show that a great portion of these firms, while operating at excessive capital structure with leverage ratio over 100%, are financially and operationally healthy. These healthy negative book equity firms increase their debt primarily motived by a need for funds to fulfill investment demand. We also find that the off‐balance sheet intangible assets and quality of intangible assets play an important role in determining the true debt capacity of these firms.