No abstract

Urban village collectives, as one of the stakeholders of land requisition and development in urbanized China, have gradually been driven into real estate development. This transformation has raised an important question regarding how villagers develop their 'property mind'. From 2015 to 2017, guided by an abductive institutional economics approach, which holds both original and new institutional economics in dialogue, we addressed this question by conducting fieldwork in Xiaojia village, Northeast China. In Northeast China, unlike in the southern cities, there was no foreign investment and the population was in decline. Nevertheless, the villagers developed housing, first for their own use and then for the market. The resulting evidence indicates the following: 1) property rights are social relations and constructed socially and institutionally; 2) markets are not independent, they are conditioned by the institutional context.

Economic transitions from fishing into coastal tourism are common in many contemporary coastal communities globally, and particularly in the case of China. Drawing on interviews from a village in Liaoning province in Northeastern China, we use a political economy framework to more systematically understand the drivers and outcomes associated with the transition from fishing to tourism. We find that while state policies and market forces have encouraged shifts away from fishing and into tourism, tourism is currently governed largely by informal institutions informed by social relations and culture. Our findings emphasise how economic transitions from fishing to coastal tourism are mediated by these inter-related and shifting relationships between state, society, and markets.

Since the economic reforms of the 1970s, local Chinese urban authorities have requisitioned rural land near cities. To protect their land from these practices, many urban village collectives have established a cooperative shareholding system, but their motives remain unclear. Neoclassical economics suggests that such enterprises seek to maximize profits. Guided by the original institutionaleconomics approach, I investigate this question empirically by interviewing residents of Mengke village in Chaoyang city, Liaoning Province, northeast China. These data reveal four startling findings about the motives behind the shareholding system. First, collective economic organizations do not simply seek the maximization of profit. Second, the shareholding cooperative system adopted by village collectives helps villagers resist external threats such as land loss. Third, the collective economic organization is not merely a firm or a single market; it may work as a firm and a market simultaneously. Finally, managing of common property contributes to maintaining the identity of the collective. These findings suggest that the theories of neoclassical urban economics and new institutional economics fundamentally mischaracterize urban cooperatives.