Android malware is a persistent threat to billions of users around the world. As a countermeasure, Android malware detection systems are occasionally implemented. However, these systems are often vulnerable to evasion attacks, in which an adversary manipulates malicious instances so that they are misidentified as benign. In this paper, we launch various innovative evasion attacks against several Android malware detection systems. The vulnerability inherent to all of these systems is that they are part of Androguard [34], a popular open source library used in Android malware detection systems. Some of the detection systems decrease to a 0% detection rate after the attack. Therefore, the use of open source libraries in malware detection systems calls for caution.In addition, we present a novel evaluation scheme for evasion attack generation that exploits the weak spots of known Android malware detection systems. In so doing, we evaluate the functionality and maliciousness of the manipulated instances created by our evasion attacks. We found variations in both the maliciousness and functionality tests of our manipulated apps. We show that non-functional apps, while considered malicious, do not threaten users and are thus useless from an attacker's point of view. We conclude that evasion attacks must be assessed for both functionality and maliciousness to evaluate their impact, a step which is far from commonplace today.
Android malware is a continuously expanding threat to billions of mobile users around the globe. Detection systems are updated constantly to address these threats. However, a backlash takes the form of evasion attacks, in which an adversary changes malicious samples such that those samples will be misclassified as benign. This paper fully inspects a well-known Android malware detection system, MaMaDroid, which analyzes the control flow graph of the application. Changes to the portion of benign samples in the train set and models are considered to see their effect on the classifier. The changes in the ratio between benign and malicious samples have a clear effect on each one of the models, resulting in a decrease of more than 40% in their detection rate. Moreover, adopted ML models are implemented as well, including 5-NN, Decision Tree, and Adaboost. Exploration of the six models reveals a typical behavior in different cases, of tree-based models and distance-based models. Moreover, three novel attacks that manipulate the CFG and their detection rates are described for each one of the targeted models. The attacks decrease the detection rate of most of the models to 0%, with regards to different ratios of benign to malicious apps. As a result, a new version of MaMaDroid is engineered. This model fuses the CFG of the app and static analysis of features of the app. This improved model is proved to be robust against evasion attacks targeting both CFG-based models and static analysis models, achieving a detection rate of more than 90% against each one of the attacks.
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