IN the April number of MIND, Mr. G. E. Moore has mode " a short statement about ohapter ii. " of my Essay on the Nature of Truth. Although I am reluctant to write on this subject at present, I will try, out of respect for Mr. Moore, to answer his paper." Mr. Joachim," he remarks on page 230, "does not profess to be quite sure whether the main views he attacks are really held by Mr. Bussell and me, or not; he says he may have misunderstood our words." The reasons for my hesitation are stated in § 12 of my book. It never occurred to me that Messrs. Moore and Bussell had " used misleading language " ; but I felt it a difficulty that (with regard to some points) they have used no language at all. When this difficulty is removed-and I gather from Mr. Moore's words 1 that he hopes before long to publish a systematic exposition of his views-Mr. Moore will find me ready, and even anxious, to be convinced. For most certainly I have formed no opinion that he is " dogmatic and unconvincing," although I freely confess that he has not yet convinced me.Mr. Moore proceeds to formulate three propositions, which it will be safest to quote verbatim. They are:-"I. That some facts are facts, and some truths true, which never have been, are not now, and never will be experienced at all, and which are not timelessly experienced either." II. That some of the facts and truths, which we do sometimes experience, are facts and are true, not only at the times at which they are experienced, but also either, at times at which they are not experienced at all, or else timelessly; and that these facts and truths are not timelessly experienced either." III. That precisely and numerically the same fact or truth may at one time be experienced by me, when I am seeing the sea and am not seeing a house, and at another time be experienced by me, when I am not seeing the sea and am seeing a house; and ths,t precisely and numerically the same fact or truth may be experienced by me, when' I am seeing the sea and am not seeing a house, and may be experienced by another person, e.g., by Mr. Joachim, when he is not seeing the sea and is seeing a house."Mr. Moore maintains that, although I have not refuted any one 1 MIND, p. 234, "although I hope nome day to prove it ".
