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Multiculturalism's proper place in science education has been the subject of considerable controversy in the recent science education literature. It is the theme of a recent symposium in this journal, which raises and treats a wide range of issues with important ramifications for science education. A key issue-and the one on which I focus-is whether (and if so to what extent) a multicultural approach to science education is compatible with a "universalist" conception of science. My main aim is to show that there is actually much more agreement between "universalists" and multicultural "localists" concerning that compatibility than might be apparent at first glance. A second aim is to defend the former from criticisms made in the symposium papers. I first attempt to make clear what "universalism" does, and does not, involve. I then explore the justification of multicultural science education, and suggest both that that justification is moral (rather than epistemological) in nature; and that if science education is indeed obliged to embrace multiculturalism, that obligation must itself be understood to be a culturally transcendent one. Finally, I address several curricular issues treated in the symposium papers. The overall conclusion is that the most defensible conception of science education is one in which it is conceived to be both multicultural and universal.

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Educators who are reflective about their educational endeavours ask themselves questions like: What is the aim of education? What moral, methodological, or other constraints govern our educational activities and efforts? One natural place to look for answers is in the philosophy of education, which (among other things) tries to provide systematic answers to these questions. One general answer offered by the philosophy of education is that the aim of education consists in fostering the development of students' rationality. On this view, education has as its fundamental task both the development of students' reasoning ability, and also the fostering of a complex of attitudes, habits of mind, dispositions and character traits, such that students are not only able to reason well; they also care about reasons, and organize their beliefs, judgments and actions in accordance with the deliverances of the reasoned evaluation of reasons. Argumentation theory is also concerned with the analysis of the power and convicting force of reasons. When do reasons for a claim warrant acceptance of that claim? By what criteria are reasons evaluated? How are these criteria themselves justified? Such questions as these are the meat and potatoes of argumentation theory, which, in pursuing these questions, promises to shed light on the character of rationality as the aim of education. Rationality, which links education and argumentation theory, provides educators with a reason to care about argumentation-if rationality can be cogently defended as an educational ideal. In this paper I will try to provide such a defense, and in doing so explain why educators should care about argumentation. The defense will be a moral one: I will argue that we are morally obliged to endeavour to foster the rationality of students, because that is what is required to meet our obligations to treat students with respect as persons. I will also consider some general criticisms of the Enlightenment ideal of rationality, offered by Feminist, Multiculturalist, and Postmodemist scholars. If these criticisms are cogent, then both argumentation theory and the view that the aim of education is the fostering of rationality are threatened. I will argue that the criticisms, while important and instructive, are not so destructive of the ideal of rationality as some contemporary scholars suppose.

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