“Software security” often evokes negative feelings amongst software developers because this term is associated with additional programming effort, uncertainty and road blocker activity on rapid development and release cycles. The Secure DevOps movement attempts to combat the toxic environment surrounding software security by shifting the paradigm from following rules and guidelines to creatively determining solutions for tough security problems (Taschner, 2015). Secure software should be focused on a proactive approach that limits the attack surface and produces reliable software. Secure DevOps developers want their software to bend but not break, which means the software absorbs attacks and continues to function. The burgeoning concepts of DevOps include a number of concepts that can be applied to increase the security of developed applications. Applying these and other DevOps principles can have a big impact on creating an environment that is resilient and secure. Specifically, this paper clearly explains how to address security concerns in the early stages of the development lifecycle and leverage that knowledge throughout the SDLC.

No abstract

Today's incident response training, architectures, and methodologies are all built upon disconnected siloes of domain expertise, but attacks upon an organization's critical information systems are not done in a disjointed way. Attacks on critical information systems and infrastructure are not solely network, or malware, or single disks; they are coordinated, large-scale multisite attacks done in an organized manner. With the increase in frequency and sophistication of these attacks, it is not enough to rely on intrusion detection systems, trusted IT staff, or organizational information security divisions. The velocity of a cyber attack should be met with an equally coordinated response. There is a need to develop a platform that enables responders to establish trust and develop an effective collaborative response plan and investigation process across multiple organizations and legal bodies to track adversaries, mitigate the threat, get critical systems back online, and pursue legal action against the offenders. In this work we propose such a platform for efficient collaboration. Our work is informed by our practices in supporting law enforcement organizations dealing with largescale distributed attacks on critical information systems and infrastructure and by an examination of Stuxnet, a computer worm discovered in June 2010 that is believed to have been created by the United States and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Based on these experiences of operational support, the authors propose Cerebro, an Extensible Large-Scale Analysis Platform designed to fuse structured domain specific information, decision support, and collaboration in an automated fashion, to effectively detect and respond to such attacks.

No abstract