This study examines and provides empirical evidence on the association between audit committee characteristics and audit report lag, by using data from 255 companies listed in the Muscat Securities market from 2013 to 2017. Multivariate analyses show that audit committee size positively associated with audit report lag and audit committee financial expertise reduces audit lag. However, this study does not find evidence that audit committee independence and meetings are associated with audit report lag. This study concludes that internal mechanisms of corporate governance in Oman are not effective compared to more developed nations and that policymakers in this emerging market should enforce and

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the audit committee (AC) independence, financial expertise, internal audit function, audit quality and ownership concentration on earnings quality (EQ) and, consequently, ascertain whether the AC’s independence and financial expertise has a moderating effect on the relationship between internal audit function and EQ. Design/methodology/approach The study sample is 508 firms listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) for the years 2009 to 2012. EQ was measured using two modified Jones models of discretionary accruals. Findings The findings reveal that the independence of AC and investment in internal audit function, as well as the Big4 audit firm, are related to greater EQ. Ownership concentration is found to be associated with lower EQ. The study provides evidence that AC’s independence moderates the relationship between internal audit function (investment in and sourcing arrangements of internal audit function) and EQ. It also shows that AC’s financial expertise moderates the relationship between sourcing arrangements of internal audit function and EQ. Practical implications This study extends the prior related literature by examining the AC’s independence and financial expertise as moderating variables on the relationship between internal audit function and EQ. Social implications Policymakers might use the findings regarding EQ in relation to governance practices, to recognize the important roles played by the AC’s independence and financial expertise on the effectiveness of internal audit function with EQ. Originality/value This study uses the agency theory and resource dependence theory to provide empirical evidence on the impact of internal audit function and AC on EQ in the ownership concentration environment.

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Purpose -This paper aims to examine the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and board performance in monitoring roles. Design/methodology/approach -A survey questionnaire was used to gather data on board performance, while annual reports were employed to gather data on internal corporate governance mechanisms. Data for board performance were based on 112 directors who represent the companies. Findings -Factor analysis extracted two dimensions of monitoring roles: management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles. Non-independent non-executive directors and managerial ownership were found to be positively related to both dimensions of monitoring roles, while the multiple directorships of non-executive directors were negatively related to management oversight roles. Practical implications -The paper establishes the need for regulators to pay particular attention to multiple directorships, which are commonly practiced in public listed companies. The contribution of non-independent non-executive directors rather than independent directors in monitoring roles calls for further research. Regulators need to emphasize the performance evaluation roles of the board of directors (BOD), as much emphasis has been given to management oversight roles. Originality/value -The study contributes to the literature concerning monitoring roles as it shows that management oversight roles and performance evaluation roles are differentiated. The findings provide an avenue for the contribution of non-independent non-executive directors and multiple directorships in monitoring roles.

Earnings management have been considered as one of the methods used by the business leaders to mislead their stakeholders to report unrealistic numbers, despite the various check and balances (e.g. corporate governance code) on the process. Nigeria experienced two corporate governance codes issued by SEC, code 2003 and code 2011. This study tends to measure the effectiveness of these two codes and make comparisons using audit committee and audit quality against earnings management in the pre-and post-code 2011.