Purpose of this paper To investigate the possible co-integration and the direction of causality between financial development, international trade and economic growth in India. Design/methodology/approach Annual data covering 1965-2004 period has been used to investigate co-integration and Granger causality tests between financial development, international trade and growth after employing unit root tests to see if the variables under consideration are stationary. Findings Results reveal that there is long run equilibrium relationship between financial development, international trade and real income growth in the case of India. Furthermore, unidirectional causality was investigated that runs from real income to exports and imports, from exports to imports, M2 and domestic credits, from M2 to imports, from imports to domestic credits. Bidirectional causality has also been obtained between real income and M2, and between real income and domestic credits. Finally, no direction of causality has been obtained between M2 and domestic credits. Research limitations/implications (if applicable) A more expanded data can be used for further comparison. Practical implications (if applicable) This study has shown that the supply-leading and the demand-following hypotheses cannot be inferred for the Indian economy alone themselves. And furthermore, the export-led and the import-led hypotheses cannot again be inferred for the Indian economy based on the sample period, 1965-2004. What is original/value of paper This study is the first of its kind which investigates the possible co-integration and the direction of causality between financial development, international trade and economic growth triangle not only in the case of India but also in the relevant literature to the best knowledge of authors of this study.

A number of states and countries have promoted the development of a casino industry primarily to attract tourists. The policies operated have generally used regulatory or taxation instruments. Such policies may or may not lead to an efficient level of investment and production for the sector. This paper considers four alternative forms of regulatory and taxation policies and examines the interactions between these two sets of investments. The authors find that a turnover tax yields an efficient outcome with a competitive industry and also in the case of a cartel association; but it will be distortionary if a multiplant private monopoly controls the sector. Furthermore, a pure public sector-owned multiplant monopolist is efficient, while a tax on the fixed costs is inefficient if a casino association regulates the sector.

Abstract:In this paper, a model of the costs of a casino is developed that focuses on the implications for economic welfare of different taxation schemes for casinos. The situation being considered is in a country where casinos cater exclusively to foreign tourists. The goal of the country is to determine the maximum amount of taxes that can be extracted from the activities of this sector under different systems of taxation. When the price of gambling is set by regulation above its competitive level, the economic losses created by excessive investment in the sector can be reduced by taxation. A turnover tax on the amount gambled can maximize both tax revenue and the economic welfare of the country. Due administrative constraints, a number of countries rely on the taxation of the casinos' fixed assets or a combination of a turnover tax and a tax on fixed costs. The model is applied to the situation in North Cyprus. The annual economic efficiency loss from its poorly designed tax policies on casino gambling is estimated to be about 0.5 percent of GDP.Keywords: Casino, taxation, gambling, tourism, economic benefit JEL Codes: H21, H32, H27 There is a considerable economic literature on the operation and taxation of lotteries (Fink, Marco and Rork, 2004;Glickman and Painter, 2004;Paton, Siegel and Williams, 2004;Clotfelter and Cook, 1993;Clotfelter and Cook, 1990), but the economic literature on the economics of casinos is very limited. Most of the literature has been institutional in nature focusing on the potential of casinos to generate economic development in a region (Eadington (1999);Fink and Rock, 2003;Henrikson (1996); Gazel (1998)); alternative methods of taxation (Smith (2000); (1998)). An exception to the above literature is the paper by Thalheimer and Mukhtar, 2003. In this paper they specifically examine the determinants of demand for casino gambling including its price elasticity. In this paper, we wish to examine a number of regulatory and taxation issues while incorporating the special characteristics of the casino industry.An important characteristic of casinos is that the "price" of gambling, defined here as the percentage of the amount gambled that is retained on average by the casino, is usually not determined competitively by the interaction of the casinos in the market and the demand for casino gambling. Except for slot machines, the table games and roulette have a specific minimum expected take by the house that is set by the rules of the game (Eadington, 1999). There is no reason that these minimum prices are anywhere near to the prices that would be set in a perfectly competitive market. Second, in many jurisdictions the price of gambling is set through government regulation or by state gambling boards. In many cases the "price" is set at several multiples of what might be a competitive price 1 . In such a circumstance, the regulatory question is both one of determining the optimal "price" to set as well as the number of casinos allowed to supply the market.This characteristic is reflected ...

This paper considers alternative forms of regulation and taxation of the casino sector. The model considers the situation of a typical tourist destination country that is using casinos to attract and entertain foreign tourists. The objective is to invest in the sector efficiently while maximizing the amount of government revenue or profits accruing to the country. The regulator must determine how the price of gambling will be set, how many casinos will be allowed to enter the industry and the form and rates of taxation. Four alternative forms of regulation are considered: price regulation, state-owned monopoly, private monopoly and casino association regulation. Turnover taxes on the amount of funds gambled and also annual taxation of the fixed costs of the casinos are evaluated. Applications of the models are carried out for North Cyprus. The conclusion is that the economic efficiency costs and the revenue losses from the absence of effective regulation in these tourist destinations can be very substantial with welfare costs equal to the approximately 75 percent of the tax revenue generated by this sector. Furthermore it shows that while a tax on turnover can be efficient in the case of a competitive industry or a cartel association form of regulation, it will be distortunary if a private monopoly is controlling the sector. In contrast a tax on fixed costs will lead to an efficient result in the case of a competitive or private monopoly cases, but it will lead to allocate inefficiencies if the sector is regulated by a casino association that can only control the number of casino entering the sector.