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The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

This paper analyzes the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) on firms in Tunisia. It draws a precise picture of NTMs’ effects on firms’ imports. We use firm‐level data to take into account firm heterogeneity. We explore the impact of NTMs on small vs. medium and large firms. We also consider the differentiated impact of NTMs. Some measures have informational content and help reduce information asymmetries. When the endogeneity issue of NTMs is controlled for, results show an overall positive impact of NTMs on imports. They provide evidence that NTMs are more beneficial to the imports of medium and large firms. Moreover, NTMs with informational content have an import enhancing effect. An extended analysis separating importing and exporting firms from those solely importing suggests that both types of firms benefit from the positive effects of NTMs. This result highlights the need to assist small firms facing NTMs. Furthermore, some NTMs with informational content should be addressed carefully and not considered only as barriers to trade to be eliminated. Instead, harmonization efforts between countries can be a better policy.

Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6% more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4% more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration. JEL Codes: H26, D22, E26Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxation? The jury is out, in spite of the prevalence of political connections (Faccio 2006) and their association with anticompetitive practices (Claessens et al. 2008;Faccio et al. 2006; Mitten and Johnson 2003;Rijkers et al. 2014b). The question is especially relevant for developing countries, since lackluster revenue mobilization (Slemrod and Yithzaki 2002) and problematic state-business relationships are both symptoms and causes of underdevelopment.

This paper examines the performance of offshore firms in Tunisia for the period 2002~2014. Using firm-level data, we analyze the impact of offshoring on turnover, productivity, wages and firm survival. Overall, offshore firms perform better with respect to all of these indicators. However, in the specific case of offshore firms that export and import at the same time, called two-way offshoring, performance is weaker across the board compared to their onshore counterparts. Lower productivity of offshore firms engaged in both exporting and importing suggests that these firms are low performers and that they self-select the offshore regime to reduce their fixed costs associated with exporting. The survival analysis highlights an increased probability that these types of firms will exit the market once tariffs and tax exemption privileges end, usually after 10 years. Thus, incentives provided in the Tunisian Investment Code are primarily attracting firms in the lower rungs of global value chains.