We appreciate the comments by Dr Monneret about the staining and gating strategies in optimizing the identification of basophils to our study on the newly developed basophil activation protocol using CD63 and CCR3 [1]. He points out that CCR3 as an identification marker for basophils is also expressed in T cells (Th2 lymphocytes and regulatory T cells), thus reducing the purity of basophils and lowering their sensitivity. According to the information of the manufacturer [2] a contamination of CD3 cells in the CCR3 population occurs with a mean of 3.85% (95% CI = 2.52-5.18%; n = 8). Furthermore, in CD4 1 CD25 1 T cells, CCR3 expression appears not to exceed 5% ( fig. 1 of [3]). If we would have these 5% T cells in the CCR3 population, they would not express CD63. Therefore an activation of, e.g., 90% CD63 would be in fact only 85.5% and an activation of 15% would be 14.25% activation. These differences might be negligible for clinical purposes. Therefore we are not in accordance with the argument that staining only with CCR3 is an insufficient step for the identification of basophils. Nevertheless, we agree with Monneret, that an additional antibody labelling T cells based on CD3 expression would be an optimal staining strategy. As the Flow2 CAST was developed for clinical routine testing, the existing protocol with two antibodies is easier to handle, particularly if studies of different labs are compared. Staining with a third antibody might be the source of additional errors and cannot be performed with older flow cytometers still in use. References1 Eberlein B, Suárez IL, Darsow U, Ruëff H, Behrendt H, Ring J. A new basophil activation test using CD63 and CCR3 in allergy to antibiotics. Clin Exp Allergy 2010; 40:411-8. 2 Test Brochure Flow2 CAST s , BÜHLMANN Laboratories AG, Schönenbuch, Switzerland. Available at http://www.buhlmann labs.ch/core/allergy/flow2-cast/ 3 Ahern D, Lloyd CM, Robinson DS. Chemokine responsiveness of CD41CD251 regulatory and CD41CD25À T cells from atopic and nontopic donors. Allergy 2009; 64:1121-9. c 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Clinical & Experimental Allergy, 40 : 953-954 954 B. Eberlein et al

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This article aims to systematically clarifying the normative foundations of the ideal of full inclusion of modern societies. The comprehensive participation of all citizens is a central requirement of social justice, which is currently referred to as the concept of participatory justice. It is the expression of an ideal of inclusion for modern societies, according to which each member should be able to participate in it as an equal. This view builds on traditional debates about justice, but at the same time adds a new perspective to them. Proponents of social participation base their claims on, in one form or another, the fundamental value of social inclusion. However, the statement that social inclusion is a desirable good is by no means trivial. Rather, from a social philosophical point of view, this aspect must be developed in such a way that a justification for the purported value of social inclusion is provided. In the context of this paper, I will argue for two main theses: 1) The value of social inclusion is not intrinsically but normatively dependent on the underlying practices to which it refers, and 2) an unequal distribution of individual positions of a social order may be morally permissible (that is, it does not violate a requirement of participatory justice), if it improves the situation of all affected. An adequately inclusive society should not marginalize individuals or groups, but must treat everyone as equal. The ideal of an inclusive society therefore stands for a society, in which every member participates in it as an equal on the basis of his or her individual talents and interests. Hence, exclusion from the society is morally wrong. However, full membership does not mean the most inclusive scheme possible in all sections of society, but rather stands for good, qualified participation.

dar, das zwar ein hohes Beschreibungspotenzial für soziale Zusammenhänge bereithält, Individuen aber kaum signifi kante Handlungsspielräume zubilligt. Auf der anderen Seite lassen Praxistheorien aber auch den handlungstheoretischen Fokus von Rational-Choice-Ansätzen (vgl. Becker 1982; Axelrod 1987; Diekmann/ Voss 2004) und damit die Fiktion immerzu bewusst und rational agierender Akteure hinter sich. Praxistheorien nehmen demgegenüber eine Mittelposition ein, die einerseits das »Gegebensein« (Jaeggi) von sozialen Praktiken-und damit die oft mals routinemäßige Orientierung der Akteure an ihnen-nicht in Frage stellt. Andererseits erkennen praxistheoretische Ansätze ebenso die ontologische Abhängigkeit dieser Praktiken von den Reproduktionsleistungen der Akteure an. Praktiken werden als die zentralen Ordnungsstrukturen des Sozialen angesehen, an denen sich das Handeln einer Gruppe von Mens chen im Regelfall orientiert und dadurch zu einem gewissen Grad erklär-und berechenbar wird.