Reviews the inter‐organizational co‐operation that may be required during an emergency. Looks at the diverse cultures of diffferent organizations together with legislation and bureaucratic procedures that need to be considered in order for this process to take place. Reinforces the need to develop an exchange model of co‐ordination. Reviews number of salient findings regarding emergency services and suggests directions that may improve inter‐organizational relationships.

Examines the disastrous industrial accidents globally since the Second World War. Change and innovation development have accelerated dramatically through this century. The war itself influenced various developments. Argues that environmental problems are problems of development. Bhopal, Chernobyl, Exxon Valdez, Kuwait's oil wells and Siberian pipelines are all used as examples. Industrial activity and social change have increased vulnerability to man-made hazards. Hazardous industries tend to be sited nearer the poorest and most vulnerable people, making the effects of any disaster even greater. Discusses the changing attitudes to man made disasters -from fatalistic resignation to a desire to gain greater control. Assessment, legislation and mitigation have meant improvements and are indicators of willingness and ability to handle the threats.

The term "disaster subculture" was introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, but has since not been given a great deal of attention. Even though it is still referred to in passing, the elements of disaster subculture are rarely discussed. After considering some examples of the phenomenon and its characteristics, concludes that disaster or emergency subculture does not seem to be an appropriate application of the wider sociological concept of subculture. It is not an alternative to the mainstream culture of a society but represents an aspect of that dominant culture that only manifests itself under particular circumstances. Proposes that, like other aspects of culture, it is learned by society and its members from past experience, personal as well as societal. It entails many features typical of society's cultural heritage and often entails role and behaviour changes deemed appropriate in emergencies. Concludes that, in light of this discussion, it would seem reasonable to change the term subculture as applied to disaster behaviour to bring the name in line with generally accepted usage.

So much attention is devoted to the cost of industrial disasters in financial terms and to the technologies that fail at times, that it is possible to lose sight of the fact that disasters involve people, individually and in societal groups. Although awareness and concern about the human factor in industrial disaster has grown considerably over the last 15-20 years, many continue to see human error in a very narrow perspective. People, however, play a key role in causing disasters, must cope with them when they occur, and bear the consequences in their aftermath. Consideration of the human factor in industrial disaster has focused primarily on input in causing disasters. Two additional phases of human involvement in industrial disaster, their coping and their reaction to the outcome, must be included. At every stage of its occurrence, industrial disaster is truly about people and their behaviour.

Rapid assessment of a community's capacity to continue coping in the aftermath of disaster could be of great value. Gradations of community consequences can provide emergency planners with criteria to guide them to realistic needs assessment and are invaluable to researchers in classifying incidents by intensity. Conventional wisdom might lead us to view impact on community functioning in disasters as a continuum, ranging from minimal to total collapse. Such a perception lacks clear-cut gradation, making administrative judgements difficult and contributing to the squandering of relief resources because of our inaccurate assessment of the community's incapacity. The precise points where communities cross damage thresholds resulting in the collapse of infrastructure appear at first, to vary inexplicably. Careful consideration suggests three sets of factors which interface to affect these thresholds. Taken together, these will raise or lower community capacity to cope with adversity. The appropriate level of emergency relief could best be determined if we can strengthen our ability to assess rapidly the community's remaining capacity to provide for its own population. Proposes that this could be accomplished by the scaling of three sets of factors: community background, event factors and impact factors. Although the need for scaling cannot be denied, the specifics of this suggestion will need to be tested to determine their applicability.